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I. INTRODUCTION
For most of recorded history, the majority of legal systems have
regarded domesticated animals as a species of property. 2 The classifi-
cation of animals as property to be owned and used by humans has
had ramifications throughout the law-for example, in the permissi-
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. This Article is dedicated to
the memory of Max, whose worth, to me, was infinite. The DePaul University
College of Law Summer Research Fund, Acting Dean Wayne K. Lewis and Dean
Glen Weissenberger, provided much appreciated support for my efforts in writing
this Article. I want to thank especially my research assistants, DePaul Univer-
sity law students Janice Alwin, Paige Barr, John Mueller, and Rudolph L.
Oldeschulte, for their invaluable contributions to the research for this Article.
1. One scholar has included with the rubric of "ethereal torts" causes of action for
"intangible or emotional injuries." Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 136, 138-39 (1992).
2. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 33-49 (1995) (discuss-
ing the property status of animals).
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ble degradation of the environment,3 the sanctioning of hunting,4 the
legal use of animals in scientific experiments, 5 and the underenforce-
ment of anti-cruelty laws.6 One result of the law's classification of
captive animals as private property can be seen in the tort system's
valuation of animals. 7
Most American jurisdictions allow the human owners of an injured
or destroyed animal to recover no more than the reasonable fair mar-
ket value of the animal.9 Fair market value is normally defined as the
amount a willing buyer will pay for an item and the amount a willing
seller will accept for the item where neither party is under a compul-
sion to engage in the transaction.lO In the case of a purebred show
animal, the damages could amount to several hundred dollars."l But
3. For example, before the passage of contemporary environmental protection laws,
the widespread use of insecticides resulted in the large-scale destruction of birds
and mammals. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 83-96 (1962).
4. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.50b(8) (West 1991 & Supp. 2002); N.Y.
AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW § 353-a.2 (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360(c)(1)
(2001).
5. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-4(e) (1999 & Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 717B.2.11 (West Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4310(b)(2) (1995 & Supp.
2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.1.A(1)(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 2002); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 951.02 (West 1996).
6. See Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law's Role in
Prevention, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2001).
7. Some scholars have advocated that animals be no longer legally classified as
property to be owned by humans and that they be accorded some minimal legal
rights, such as the right to be free from unnecessarily cruel treatment. See gener-
ally STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS
(2000); David Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DuKE L.J. 473
(2000); Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 531 (1998); Enger McCartney-Smith, Can Nonhuman Animals Find
Tort Protection in a Human-Centered Common Law?, 4 ANIMAL L. 173 (1998);
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA
L. REV. 1333 (2000).
8. Throughout this Article, I use the terms "pet owner," "human guardian," "human
caretaker," and the like interchangeably to refer to the person who is primarily
responsible for the health, well-being, and actions of a domesticated animal that
lives in or near the home and is kept largely for non-economic purposes. The
term "pet owner," although disfavored by some animal rights advocates, reflects
the current legal status of companion animals as personal property.
9. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
10. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 324 (2d ed. 1993).
11. See Clinton Couple Sues Town in Dog's Death, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17,
2000, available at 2000 WL 22131930 (describing lawsuit seeking damages for
$1,500 as cost of plaintiffs' purebred terrier); Joyce Cohen, Siamese, if You Please:
Finding the Right Pet, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at G4 (noting that going rate for
purebred Siamese kitten is $500); Alexandra Rockey Fleming, A Breed Apart;
Show Dogs Compete for Prizes at Fairfax Event, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at
D4 (stating that cost of purebred "pet quality" English setter is more than $500, a
show dog even more). Some domesticated animals, such as race horses, have the
potential to earn millions in racing purses and breeding fees. See Joe Drape,
Triple Crown Legend is Gone: Seattle Slew Dies at 28, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, at
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where an ordinary household pet is killed, arguably the fair market
value is zero.12 Thus where an individual deliberately poisons a
neighbor's mutt, the injured owner's recovery under tort law is usually
minimal (unless the plaintiff can establish that the defendant's con-
duct was willful, wanton, or malicious, thereby entitling the plaintiff
to punitive damages).13 In this Article, I argue that the role of com-
panion animals has evolved in our society to the point that the law
should value a pet's loss at more than fair market value and, in partic-
ular, that the law should compensate the human companion of an
animal that has been destroyed for the emotional distress and lost
companionship that the human experiences because of the animal's
death.14
Part I of this Article reviews the traditional method of valuing ani-
mals in tort cases and notes that some modern courts have expanded
beyond the classic fair market value standard and have allowed pet
owners to recover for the value of the pet to them or even for loss of
affection and companionship.15 Most courts, however, still value ani-
mals according to their fair market value, and Part I asserts that this
method of valuation produces severe undercompensation of pet own-
ers in many instances. Part II of this Article explores generally the
development of tort recoveries for "ethereal" injuries-injuries to the
psychic and the emotions. 16 Specifically, it discusses the evolution of
derivative claims for loss of consortium and society, the abolition of
certain claims for emotional distress such as alienation of affections
and similar actions, and the increased recognition of claims for inten-
tional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Part II asserts
that the same reasoning that led to an expansion of claims for ethereal
injuries dictates that the courts afford some compensation for the
emotional loss experienced because of the tortious injury to a compan-
ion animal. 17 It also notes that pet destruction cases can be analo-
gized to nuisance claims, for which many states allow recovery of
damages for mental anguish.1s
Part III of this Article explores the social science literature that
documents the emotional importance of companion animals to their
human owners. 19 This section notes the essential companionate func-
tion served by domestic animals for people-especially, for those with-
D1 (noting that famous race horse earned over one million dollars in purses and
commanded $750,000 per breeding).
12. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 225-226 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 29-85 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 86-128 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 129-172 and accompanying text.
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out human companions-and the psychic and physical benefits
conferred on individuals who have a close attachment to a pet. Given
the palpable benefits experienced by pet owners, Part III asserts that
a proper system of tort compensation should afford something more
than a minimal recovery for the wrongful death of a companion
animal.20
Part IV of this Article proposes a new rule of compensation for the
tortious destruction of companion animals that will afford a signifi-
cant recovery to pet owners. 2 1 Initially, section IV.A addresses the
general policy implications of compensating intangible losses in pet
death cases and asserts that the fundamental policies of the tort com-
pensation system are well served by recognizing such claims. 22 It ex-
plores the tort theories of compensation, deterrence, and reflection of
societal values as well as the related remedial policies of corrective
justice and economic efficiency. Section IV.B then analyzes the inade-
quacies of the current legal rules for valuing companion animals, in-
cluding the fair market value standard and the "value to the owner"
concept.2 3
Section IV.C of this Article elaborates on my proposal to compen-
sate animal guardians in pet destruction cases for both the pecuniary
and nonpecuniary components of their loss. 24 Under my proposed
scheme, which could be adopted judicially or legislatively, human
guardians of companion animals would be entitled to recover both for
the fair market value (or the replacement cost, in some cases) of their
animals and for the mental anguish and grief experienced as a result
20. See infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 173-308 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 237-258 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 200-224 and accompanying text.
24. A number of recent articles have explored the issue of animal valuation and have
concluded that the traditional market standard of compensation is outmoded.
See generally Geordie Duckler, The Economic Value of Companion Animals: A
Legal and Anthropological Argument for Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199
(2002) (arguing that an animal's "special value" to the owner, as distinct from its
market value, should be the basis for assigning animals monetary worth); Re-
becca J. Huss, Valuing Man's and Woman's Best Friend: The Moral and Legal
Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47 (2002) (asserting that veteri-
narians and other animal service providers should be liable for noneconomic
damages, especially if reckless, wilfull, or wanton conduct is involved); Janice M.
Pintar, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fair Market
Value Approach in Wisconsin: The Case for Extending Tort Protection to Compan-
ion Animals and Their Owners, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 735 (2002) (urging Wisconsin
to expand compensation to pet owners to include the actual value of the animal to
the owner plus, in extraordinary situations, severe emotional distress); William
C. Root, 'Man's Best Friend'. Property or Family Member? An Examination of the
Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recover-
able for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423 (2002) (noting that
the market value approach does not adequately compensate many companion
animal owners whose pets have been wrongfully injured or killed).
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of their animals' premature death. 25 In proving the extent of their
mental distress, plaintiffs would be required to show the duration, na-
ture, and quality of their relationship with the now deceased animal,
and the court would instruct the trier of fact to consider such elements
in setting damages for mental anguish. In addition, plaintiffs would
be allowed to recover damages for the loss of companionship of their
pet for a reasonable replacement period.26 If enacted legislatively,
this scheme, I argue, should include a cap on the total amount of dam-
ages for noneconomic losses associated with a pet's death. A cap
would serve to allay concerns about possible excessive awards given
by overly sympathetic juries.
Finally, in Section IV.D of this Article, I will also respond to the
possible policy objections to my proposal and demonstrate that these
objections can be overcome in a properly tailored compensation
scheme. 27 In the end, I argue that the basic remedial purpose of com-
pensation for injuries outweighs the proffered policy problems. 28
II. TRADITIONAL LEGAL METHODS OF VALUING ANIMALS
Historically, the courts have regarded domestic animals as, at
most, a type of personal property like a buggy or a table. 29 In fact, the
early common law did not even regard companion animals, such as
dogs, as achieving the status of property,30 though they later evolved
to that status.3 1 Because of these property-based notions of animals,
tort law applied personal property concepts to the valuation of ani-
mals. Today, in almost all states, if an individual tortiously destroys
another's animal, he or she is liable for the animal's fair market
value.32 Fair market value is generally defined as the price a willing
25. See infra notes 225-231 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 259-308 and accompanying text.
28. Id.
29. See Brown v. Eberly, No. 99-1076, 2002 WL 31528675, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14,
2002); Bobin v. Sammarco, No. 94-5115, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6671, at *7-8
(E.D. Pa. May 17, 1995); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *390.
30. Under English common law individuals had only a very limited and qualified
property interest in companion animals, such as dogs, cats, parrots, and singing
birds. These animals were viewed as being kept at the owner's caprice, as having
no intrinsic value, and as not being subject to an action for larceny. Citizens'
Rapid Transit Co. v. Dew, 45 S.W. 790, 791 (Tenn. 1898); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTAMES *393. See also Johnson v. McConnell, 22 P. 219, 220 (Cal. 1889)
(noting that dogs have "nearly always been held 'to be entitled to less regard and
protection than more harmless domestic animals').
31. Altman v. City of High Point, N.C., 330 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2003); Roos v.
Loeser, 183 P. 204, 204-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919); Hill v. Micham, 157 N.E. 13, 14
(Ohio 1927); White v. State, 249 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tenn. 1952).
32. Richardson v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985);
Wells v. Brown, 217 P.2d 995, 997-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950); Nichols v. Sukaro
Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Iowa 1996); Uhlein v. Cromack, 109 Mass. 273,
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buyer will offer and a willing seller will accept, where neither is under
a compulsion to act 33 and where each party has fairly extensive
knowledge about the property being sold.3 4 In the agrarian society of
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, fair market value accurately
reflected the true worth of most animals to their owners. 35 Cattle,
oxen, horses, pigs, and other livestock were kept for commercial pur-
poses. 36 The destruction of a head of cattle meant either that the
owner had to buy a replacement on the open market, if the particular
animal was being held for breeding purposes, or that the owner lost
the ability to sell it for its fair market, if it was being held for sale.
Even dogs and cats were valued more for their working abilities than
as companion animals.3 7
274 (1872); Soucek v. Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Lewis
v. DiDonna, 743 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Melton v. South Shore
U-Drive, Inc., 303 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969); Smith v. Palace
Transp. Co. 253 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1931); Green v. Leckington, 236
P.2d 335, 340 (Or. 1951); Dillon v. O'Connor, 412 P.2d 126, 127-28 (Wash. 1966).
If there is no market for the animal at the place of destruction, then the plaintiff
may recover the animal's fair market value at the nearest market plus the cost of
transportation to that market. Leonard v. Fitchburg R.R., 9 N.E. 667, 668 (Mass.
1887); Greenwald v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co., 76 So. 557, 557 (Miss. 1917).
In addition, if an animal is merely injured, courts commonly award as damages
the difference in the animal's fair market value before and after the injury.
Rosche v. Wayne Feed Div. Cont'l Grain Co., 447 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Wis. Ct. App.
1989). See generally Robin Cheryl Miller, Damages for Killing or Injuring Dog,
61 A.L.R. 5th 635 (1998) (noting the predominance of the market value standard).
33. Finkelstein v. Dep't of Transp., 656 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1995); McCurdy v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 413 P.2d 617, 623 (Wash. 1966).
34. See Landers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 915 P.2d 614, 616 (Alaska 1996) (refer-
ring to a "fully informed seller" and a "fully informed buyer"); City of San Diego v.
Neumann, 863 P.2d 725, 728 (Cal. 1993) (referring to both parties' having "full
knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is reasonably
adaptable and available").
35. Nineteenth century courts were consistent in awarding market value for the loss
of any living creature recognized as personal property. See Ellis v. Welch, 38
S.C.L. 468 (S.C. 1851) (sustaining award of value of escaped slave).
36. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Brady, 32 Md. 333, 339 (1870) (sustaining
award of market value of cattle); Atwood v. Boston Forwarding & Transfer Co.,
71 N.E. 72, 72 (Mass. 1904) (upholding award of value of horse). Modern courts
continue to apply the market value standard for measuring damages for the loss
of animals held for commercial purposes, as well as those held as pets. Snyder v.
Bio-Lab, Inc., 405 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
37. Dogs, of course, served various functions in the rural home - for example, guard-
ing, herding, and hunting. See, e.g., Heiligmann v. Rose, 16 S.W. 931, 932 (Tex.
1891) (guarding); Bowers v. Horan, 53 N.W. 535, 535 (Mich. 1892) (herding); Mo.
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chase, 23 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ark. 1930) (hunting). Cats were es-
sential in keeping down the rodent population. Smith v. Steineauf, 36 P.2d 995,
997 (Kan. 1934).
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Today, some pets, in fact, do have a significant fair market value,
especially purebred animals used for breeding purposes. 38 But most
average cats and dogs have a negligible fair market value. 39 In light
of this fact, some courts have hesitantly acknowledged that the plain-
tiff whose pet has been killed should be allowed to prove the pet's
"value to the owner."40 The concept of "value to the owner" has been
recognized in a number of situations where destroyed personal prop-
erty has no easily ascertainable fair market value or where fair mar-
ket value produces an unfairly small compensation 41-such as
clothing, trophies, family photographs, and the like.42 Although
"value to the owner" is a substitute for the fair market value concept
in tort cases, it is still theoretically predicated on some sort of pecuni-
ary loss.43 For example, an individual testifying as to the value of his
38. See Demeo v. Manville, 386 N.E.2d 917, 918-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (awarding
$500 based on dog's "commercial value" as a show dog); Quave v. Bardwell, 449
So. 2d 81, 84 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding award of $2,500 for dog based on its
breeding value); Williams v. McMahan, No. 26983-0-II, 2002 WL 242538, at *2-3
(Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that damages for breeding dog should be based on
the dog's fair market value, which was said to be $400).
39. See Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) ("It is undisputed
that Hair Bear, an unregistered mixed breed with no particular training or skill
other than as a companion, had no market value."); Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d
630, 632-33 (Vt. 1997) ("A pet dog generally has no substantial market value as
such .... Like most pets, its worth is not primarily financial, but emotional.").
40. See Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 313 (Alaska 2001) (adopting value to the
owner approach for dog); Ramey v. Collins, No. 99CA2665, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS
2540, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 5, 2000) (same); McDonald v. Ohio State Univ.
Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (awarding damages
of $5,000 for dog based on value to the owner standard). Cf Williams v. McMa-
han, No. 26983-0-II, 2002 WL 242538, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2002)
(disallowing value to the owner approach where dog had a market value).
41. See Wall v. Platt, 48 N.E. 270, 273 (Mass. 1897) ("In some cases there is no mar-
ket value, properly speaking; and in others, if there is, it plainly would not of
itself afford full indemnity.").
42. See, e.g., Sarkesian v. Cedric Chase Photographic Lab's, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 745, 746
(Mass. 1949) (applying value to the owner standard to destruction of roll of ex-
posed film); Crisp v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. 1963)
(holding that damages for household goods, clothing, and personal effects should
be measured by their "value to the owner," excluding any fanciful or sentimental
attachment).
43. "Value to the owner" attempts to bridge the gap between fair market value and
replacement cost. For household items and clothing, for example, fair market
value is usually extremely low, either because there is not much of a market in
used household items or because market participants will not pay much for used
personal items, such as clothing that has been worn by someone else. The courts
have assumed that awarding fair market value in this situation undercompen-
sates the plaintiff because most plaintiffs will not replace their destroyed clothing
or lamp in the used market. Rutherford v. James, 270 P. 794, 795 (N.M. 1928);
Lane v. Oil Delivery, Inc., 524 A.2d 405, 409 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987). On the other
hand, replacement value tends to overcompensate plaintiffs in these cases. A
plaintiff who receives the replacement cost of her three-year-old used coat is able
2004]
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wardrobe to him is expected to refer to the cost of the clothing when
new, the age of the clothing when destroyed, the replacement cost, and
other economic markers. 44 Hence, even under the "value to the
owner" concept, the family pet may again fall short, and its loss may
produce a minimal recovery because courts tie "value to the owner" to
pecuniary considerations. 4 5
Notwithstanding the strictures of traditional common law theories,
a few courts have expanded the "value to the owner" concept to include
sentimental or emotional attachment to the destroyed object.46 In
some cases, pet owners have been able to plead and prove damages
resulting from the sentimental loss experienced upon their pet's
death.4 7 Even in these cases, however, the appellate courts have been
hesitant to validate awards greater that a few hundred dollars. 48
In addition, where the tortfeasor has intentionally or recklessly
killed an animal, the courts have upheld awards of punitive dam-
ages,4 9 but once again the recoveries have been relatively small. In
Wilson v. City of Eagan, for example, the jury had awarded a total of
$5,000 in punitive damages against municipal officials who had de-
stroyed the plaintiff's cat before the five-day impoundment period had
expired. 50 The trial court reduced the punitive damages to $500, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the reduction. 5 1 The supreme
to buy a brand new coat, which presumably has a longer useful life and a more
up-to-date style than the coat that was destroyed.
44. Lane v. Oil Delivery, Inc., 524 A.2d 405, 409 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987); DeSpirito v.
Bristol County Water Co., 227 A.2d 782, 784 (R.I. 1967).
45. See McCallister v. Sappingfield, 144 P. 432, 434 (Or. 1914) (noting that value of a
dog to its owner should be based on the pecuniary value of its services or useful-
ness); Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (suggesting
that a dog's value to its owner might be determined by the reasonably expected
stud fees over the animal's life, discounted to present value).
46. See, e.g., Bond v. A.H. Belo Corp., 602 S.W.2d 105, 109 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980) (hold-
ing that plaintiff could recover "the reasonable special value" of family papers
and photographs to her, "taking into consideration the feelings of the owner for
such property").
47. See LaPorte v. Associated Indep's, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964) (allowing
damages for the affection of an owner for her dog); Jankoski v. Preiser Animal
Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (allowing trial court to
include some element of sentimental value for dog).
48. See Jankoski, 510 N.E.2d at 1087 ("It appears clear that damages in such cases,
while not merely nominal, are severely circumscribed.").
49. Parker v. Mise, 27 Ala. 480, 483 (1855); LaPorte v. Associated Indep's, Inc. 163
So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964); Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 810 (Ky. Ct. App.
2001); Rimbaud v. Beiermeister, 154 N.Y.S. 333, 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915);
Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). But see Soucek v.
Banham, 524 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (disallowing punitive dam-
ages because action for death of pet was based on damage to property interest).
50. 297 N.W.2d 146, 147-48 (Minn. 1980). The jury had also awarded $40 as compen-
satory damages. Id. at 148.
51. Id. at 151.
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court stated that lower courts, in determining whether the amount of
punitive damages is excessive, should consider "the degree of malice,
intent, or willful disregard, the type of interest invaded, the amount
needed to truly deter such conduct in the future, and the cost of bring-
ing the suit."5 2
In assessing the appropriateness of punitive damage awards, some
courts seemingly use a test of proportionality and examine whether
the amount of punitive damages is proportional to the amount of ac-
tual damages awarded.53 Many appellate courts feel uncomfortable
with punitive awards that greatly exceed the amount of compensatory
damages. 54 Because compensatory damages for loss of a companion
animal have historically been so low, punitive damages have tended to
be relatively low as well. As such, they may not adequately deter or
punish reckless and intentional conduct that leads to a pet's death.
Some inventive plaintiffs have attempted to append a claim for loss
of society and companionship55 or for emotional anguish56 to their
complaints for destruction of their companion animals. Courts have
rarely recognized such claims,57 relying on a number of justifications,
52. Id.
53. Some courts do not allow punitive damages to be awarded at all if there are no
actual damages. Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1984). If a pet dog or
cat has a negligible legal value, in many cases the plaintiff will receive neither
compensatory nor punitive damages.
54. A number of United States Supreme Court cases have suggested that if punitive
damages exceed compensatory damages by an extraordinarily large ratio, they
may be "grossly excessive" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003); BMW, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alli-
ance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 23 (1991). Although the Court has consistently refused to recognize a
bright line standard for what is an acceptable ratio between punitive and com-
pensatory damages, it has indicated that overwhelmingly large ratios "raise a
suspicious judicial eyebrow." BMW, Inc., 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting TXO Prod.
Corp., 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
55. Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Jankoski
v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 859 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
56. LaPorte v. Associated Indep's, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 267 (Fla. 1964); Campbell v.
Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Haw. 1981); Nichols v. Sukaro
Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Iowa 1996); Fackler v. Genetzky, 257 Neb. 130,
132, 595 N.W.2d 884, 887 (1999).
57. See Soto v. United States, No. 1:01-CV-117, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10743, at *8
(W.D. Mich. July 23, 2001), aff'd, No. 01-2331, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 7292 (6th
Cir. Apr. 16, 2003) (denying emotional distress damages in the death of a pet);
Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (disallow-
ing claim for loss of companionship for a pet's death); Altieri v. Nanavati, 573
A.2d 359, 361 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (suggesting that emotional distress dam-
ages are not available in veterinary malpractice case); Jankoski v. Preiser
Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1085 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (same); Nichols v.
Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996) (denying damages for mental
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including the traditional classification of animals as property58 and
the unavailability of noneconomic damages in the state wrongful
death act. 59 Because the law classifies animals as personal property,
the owner cannot experience a loss of the animal's companionship,6O
just as one cannot suffer the loss of companionship of a sofa or a car.
Also, presumably as personal property, animals can be replaced. If
one's sofa or car is destroyed, one buys another without much, if any,
emotional disturbance. The same can be said of the loss of a pet-i.e.,
one can also obtain another cat, dog, or bird without any great diffi-
culty, emotional or practical. 6 1
anguish in the death of a pet); Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2002) (same); Fish v. Lyons, No. 97-4145-E, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 544,
at *13 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1998) (same); Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d
1286, 1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209,
211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (same); Fackler v. Genetzky, 257 Neb. 130, 138-39, 595
N.W.2d 884, 891-92 (1999) (same); Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S. 2d 627, 628
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (same); Lewis v. DiDonna, 743 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (same); Buchanan v. Stout, 108 N.Y.S. 38, 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908)
(same); Lockett v. Hill, 51 P.3d 5, 8 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (same); Daughen v. Fox,
539 A.2d 858, 859 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (same); Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368,
369-70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (same); Williams v. McMahan, No. 26983-0-II, 2002
WL 242538 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2002) (same); Julian v. DeVincent, 184
S.E.2d 535, 536 (W. Va. 1971). But see McAdams v. Faulk, No. CA01-1350, 2002
Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at *13 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (allowing pet owner
damages for mental anguish); Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37,
38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (same); Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 367
So. 2d 1246, 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (same); City of Garland v. White, 368
S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (same). One court suggested that the plain-
tiff could recover for the mental suffering that she experienced upon her cat's
wrongful death only if the defendant acted with malice or intent. Paul v. Osceola
County, 388 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See generally Jay M. Zitter,
Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Due to Treatment of Pets and Ani-
mals, 91 A.L.R. 5th 545 (2001) (noting the split of authority on this issue).
58. Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) ("dog.... is
deemed to be personal property").
59. Because the New Jersey wrongful death act did not allow recovery for loss of a
child's or spouse's society, the court found it inconceivable that the loss of a pet's
society should be compensable. Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1146
(N.J. Super. Ct. 2001).
60. One court restricted the notion of companionship to the marriage relationship:
"[c]ompanionship is included in the concept of consortium, which is a right grow-
ing out of a marriage relationship giving to each spouse the right to the compan-
ionship, society and affection of each other in their life together." Daughen v.
Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
61. In fact, given the hundreds of thousands of homeless animals in the United
States, it is quite simple to obtain a pet at relatively low cost. See Rick Marin,
Worst in Show, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, at B8 (stating the New York City shel-
ter system alone processes several thousand dogs each year). A typical shelter
requires an adoption fee of less than one hundred dollars to assist with operating
costs. Sharon Barrett, Pet Projects, Cm. TRIB. MAG., July 28, 2002, at 15 (quoting
an adoption fee of $40-60); Joyce Cohen, Siamese, if You Please: Finding the Right
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The emotional distress the owner feels upon the death of a compan-
ion animal is theoretically different from loss of companionship, but
most courts have similarly refused claims for emotional distress dam-
ages.6 2 Emotional distress could be characterized as the anguish and
grief that one experiences upon learning of the demise of one's pet, in
other words, the negative feelings associated with the unexpected
loss. 6 3 Companionship, however, represents the ongoing positive as-
pects of the human-animal relationship, the friendship, attachment
and pleasant experiences that are part of the relationship. 6 4 One
could compensate for both elements, neither element, or one but not
the other. Most courts have been no more willing to award damages
for emotional distress in animal death cases than they have been in-
clined to give damages for loss of companionship. 65 Courts again
ground this position in the status of animals as property66 and the
concern that awarding emotional distress damages for one species of
property might lead to claims for mental anguish associated with the
destruction of other types of property, such as cars, furniture, and
clothing.67 Just as one can have a favorite pet, one can also have a
favorite pair of shoes.68
In addition to regarding animals as personal property, modern
courts have also observed that actions for human decedents are gov-
erned strictly by statute, and if a novel remedy for animal destruction
is to be created, the legislature is the appropriate body to fashion such
Pet, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at G4 ($80). In addition, web-based pet-finding
services now place homeless animals online. Id.
62. Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
63. See Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. 1986) ("Mental anguish repre-
sents an emotional response to the death itself").
64. See 3 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 22.05[1] (2000) ("The
loss of [society] represents a loss of the positive benefits that flowed to the family
from the deceased's having been part of it.").
65. See supra note 57 and cases cited therein.
66. Fackler v. Genetzky, 257 Neb. 130, 138-39, 595 N.W.2d 884, 891 (1999).
67. Courts have not totally disallowed mental suffering damages associated with in-
juries to property. Some states have allowed plaintiffs to recover in trespass and
nuisance actions for the emotional anguish endured as a result of the invasion of
their interest in real property. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 80
So. 2d 845, 850 (La. 1955) (affirming damages for mental anguish where defend-
ants' use of explosives on nearby property caused damage to the plaintiffs' prop-
erty as well as disturbing them).
68. One court, however, had no difficulty distinguishing between attachment to a
companion animal and attachment to other types of personal property: "An heir-
loom while it might be the source of good feelings is merely an inanimate object
and is not capable of returning love and affection. It does not respond to human
stimulation; it has no brain capable of displaying emotion which in turn causes a
human response." Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182,
183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (allowing plaintiff to recover for mental anguish associ-
ated with the wrongful disposal of her dog's body).
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a remedy and to weigh the competing policy considerations. 6 9 Insofar
as the wrongful death acts do not provide for a particular type of dam-
ages or a particular type of claimant, courts have been loath histori-
cally to expand the act to include novel claims.7 0 Because traditional
common law never recognized claims based on the wrongful death of
humans,71 judges are perhaps understandably reluctant to create a
common law cause of action for the wrongful death of a pet.
In an attempt to sidestep the constraints of the traditional recov-
eries for destruction of personal property, some pet-owning plaintiffs
have pursued another totally distinct type of claim-negligent72 or in-
tentional 73 infliction of emotional distress. In these claims, the plain-
tiffs are arguing that the defendants either deliberately or negligently
inflicted emotional harm upon them through their wrongful actions.
Both negligent and intentional infliction claims, however, often
founder for different reasons. A claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress requires that the defendant deliberately or recklessly
inflicted severe emotional harm upon the plaintiff, that the defendant
engaged in "outrageous" conduct, and that such conduct caused the
69. Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286, 1289-90 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Koester v.
VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Harabes v.
Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001); Rabideau v. City of
Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 807 (Wis. 2001) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
70. For example, most jurisdictions hold that plaintiffs may not recover for the
mental anguish suffered at the decedent's death, primarily because the federal
and state wrongful death acts often authorize compensation for only "pecuniary
loss." Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 31-32 (1990); Lundman v. Mc-
Kown, 530 N.W.2d 807,829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Nelson v. Dolan, 230 Neb. 840,
853-54, 434 N.W.2d 25, 29 (1989); Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1291 (N.J.
1993). Interestingly, however, many of the same courts allow wrongful death
plaintiffs to recover for loss of the decedent's affection, companionship, and soci-
ety even though those elements are nonpecuniary in nature. 3 JEROME H. NATES
ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 22.06[3] (2002).
71. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS 803 (2001).
72. Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Kaiser v.
United States, 761 F. Supp. 150, 156 (D.D.C. 1991); Roman v. Carroll, 621 P.2d
307, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Rees v. Flaherty, No. CV010077316, 2003 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 289, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 6, 2003); Perry v. Valley Cot-
tage Animal Hosp., 690 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Fowler v. Town
of Ticonderoga, 516 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Rabideau v. City of
Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 800 (Wis. 2001).
73. Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 217 (3rd Cir. 2001); Snyder v.
Seidelman, No. 5:94:CV:90, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11582, at *10 (W.D. Mich.
July 7, 1995); Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 311 (Alaska 2001); Katsaris v.
Cook, 225 Cal. Rptr. 531, 537(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d
806, 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Sprague v. Batchelder, No. 94-231, 1995 Me. Super.
LEXIS 110, at *2 (Me. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995); Kautzman v. McDonald, 621
N.W.2d 871, 876 (N.D. 2001); Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
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plaintiff severe emotional distress. 74 Often, it is difficult for plaintiffs
to show that the defendant had the requisite intent. In one case, for
example, the court found that a defendant veterinarian's misconduct
was focused on the plaintiffs' dog, not upon the plaintiffs them-
selves.7 5 Moreover, the defendant's conduct may not be considered
"outrageous" in many instances - e.g., the defendant kills the plain-
tiffs dog who is chasing the defendant's livestock on the defendant's
own property. 76 Pet owners have occasionally succeeded in pressing
intentional infliction claims where the defendant's actions in killing
the plaintiffs animal were particularly vicious and malicious.
77
Jurisdictions vary widely in the exact requisites for a claim for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress.7 8 Most states require that
plaintiffs pressing "bystander" claims7 9 have witnessed the accident
74. Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). In judging whether particular conduct is outra-
geous, courts normally consider the sensibilities of the average member of the
community. Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 218 (3rd Cir. 2001).
Some cases hold that, additionally, the "outrageousness of the conduct may arise
instead... from the actor's knowledge of the plaintiffs particular susceptibility."
Katsaris v. Cook, 225 Cal. Rptr. 531, 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
75. Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
76. Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 312 (Alaska 2001); see also Kautzman v. Mc-
Donald, 621 N.W.2d 871, 877 (N.D. 2001) (holding that the deputy sheriffs con-
duct in shooting some free-roaming dogs could not be considered "outrageous"
where the dogs appeared aggressive); Fish v. Lyons, No. 97-4145-E, 1998 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 544, at *12 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 1998) (holding that, as a
matter of law, the defendant's statement to the plaintiff that he, after killing the
plaintiffs dog, had the "dog's head in a bucket ready to go to the state lab for
testing" was not outrageous or "utterly intolerable in a civilized community").
77. See, e.g., Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 809-11 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (sustaining
an award of compensatory and punitive damages based on intentional infliction
of emotional distress where the defendants, after agreeing to care for the plain-
tiffs horses, sold them to a "known slaughter-buyer"); Lawrence v. Stanford, 655
S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tenn. 1983) (noting that the plaintiffs' veterinarian's threat to
"do away" with the plaintiffs' dog was "outrageous and extreme and ... not toler-
able in a civilized society").
78. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS 836-38 (2001). California, for example, rec-
ognizes three categories of claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress: (1)
those founded on a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant -
e.g., patient-therapist; (2) those where the plaintiff is the direct object of some
aspect of the defendant's conduct; and (3) bystander cases, where the plaintiff
witnessed a physical injury to a close relative caused by the defendant's negli-
gence. Christensen v. Superior Ct., 271 Cal. Rptr. 360, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
79. Those states allowing "direct victim" claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress normally have stringent requirements for such claims. They often re-
quire that the plaintiffs' emotional distress have manifested itself in some con-
crete and definable physical injury. Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660
F. Supp. 1516, 1516 (W.D. Mich. 1987). Under this standard, mere emotional
anguish without corresponding physical symptoms would be insufficient. See
Soto v. United States, No. 1:01-CV-117, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10743, at *8 (W.D.
Mich. July 23, 2001), affd, No. 01-2331, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 7292 (6th Cir.
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in which the loved one was killed, or at least the accident's immediate
aftermath.S0 As a result, many pet-owning plaintiffs would have no
claim if the pet were killed outside of their presence.8 1 Even if the
plaintiff had observed the accident, many courts would not consider a
pet to be within the class of "close relatives" whose injury might pro-
duce compensable emotional distress in the plaintiff-bystander.82
In sum, then, the fair market value standard of compensation ar-
guably has left many pet-owning plaintiffs with the prospect of mini-
mal recoveries where a defendant negligently or intentionally destroys
their companion animals.8 3 Although a few courts have adopted the
"value to the owner" standard in an effort to compensate plaintiffs
more fully, recoveries overall remain low. Most courts refuse to recog-
nize any liability for emotional anguish or loss of companionship in
these cases, and claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress have largely failed as well.
Apr. 16, 2003) (denying plaintiff-dog owner's claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress because of a lack of physical injury). A few courts recognize direct
claims for negligent infliction where the plaintiff and the defendant have a spe-
cial relationship, such as patient-physician. Burgess v. Superior Ct., 831 P.2d
1197, 1204 (Cal. 1992). The "special relationship" criterion conceivably opens
the door to pet owners' asserting negligent infliction claims based on their rela-
tionship with their veterinarian.
80. See Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 444-45 (Wis. 1994)
(rejecting the "zone of danger" rule but requiring that the plaintiff have "observed
an extraordinary event" - in this case, her fatally injured son trapped in the auto-
mobile wreckage).
81. See Sprague v. Batchelder, No. 94-231, 1995 Me. Super. LEXIS 110, at *4 (Me.
Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995) (denying the plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress under the bystander rule).
82. See Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (disallowing a by-
stander claim for mental anguish caused by veterinary malpractice); Rabideau v.
City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 801 (Wis. 2001) (denying a negligent infliction
claim based on the lack of familial relationship between the plaintiff and her
dog).
83. Given the legal classification of companion animals as property, some plaintiffs
have asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
where animal control or police officers have killed their animals. They have ar-
gued that where a government official destroys their pets, they have been de-
prived of their property without due process of law. Courts have unanimously
rejected such claims. Because most pet killings result from the random conduct
of local authorities, the state has no opportunity to provide a pre-deprivation pro-
cess. As long as the government provides some post-deprivation process, such as
an action for conversion, there is no due process violation. Instead, a plaintiff
would have a constitutional claim, if at all, for unreasonable seizure of personal
property under the Fourth Amendment. Brown v. Muhlenberg Township, 269
F.3d 205, 213-14 (3rd Cir. 2001); Bell v. City of Louisville, No. 3:OOCV-311-S,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21674, at *26-28 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 6, 2000); Newsome v.
Erwin, 137 F. Supp. 2d 934, 943 n.9 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Ivey v. Hamlin, No. M2001-
01310-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 404, *14-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 7,
2002).
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Much of the courts' unease with acknowledging the intangible
losses associated with a pet's death and giving some meaningful com-
pensation for them stems from the traditional policy objections prof-
fered whenever expanded tort liability is looming.8 4 But these policy
concerns have not ultimately prevented courts and legislatures from
providing compensation for noneconomic injuries in appropriate cir-
cumstances. In the next part of this Article, I examine what circum-
stances have been deemed "appropriate" and "inappropriate" and
argue that at least some compensation for the intangible losses stem-
ming from a companion animal's destruction falls on the "appropriate"
side of the ledger.8 5
III. THE GROWING RECOGNITION OF ETHEREAL CLAIMS86
Anglo-American law has always had an uneasy relationship with
claims based on an emotional or relational injury. For at least two
hundred years American courts have recognized emotional anguish as
a proper element for compensation in cases involving physical in-
jury.8 7 The common law, on the other hand, was much more reluctant
to award damages for mental suffering that was not associated with a
direct physical injury to the plaintiff.8 8 Only gradually did courts
come to recognize emotional injury by itself as a properly compensable
injury.8 9
84. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
85. One court observed that pet owners do not view their animals in economic terms:
"[W]e are mindful that anyone who has enjoyed the companionship and affection
of a pet will often spend far in excess of any possible market value to maintain or
prolong its life." Paul v. Osceola County, 388 So. 2d 40, 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
86. One scholar has included with the rubric of "ethereal torts" causes of action for
"intangible or emotional injuries." Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 136, 138-39 (1992).
87. Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894, 896 (D. Me. 1825); Seffert v. L.A. Transit
Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 342-43 (Cal. 1961); Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225, 236
(1842); Worster v. Proprietors of Canal Bridge, 33 Mass. 541, 547 (1835); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 40 Va. 748, 753 (1842).
88. See, e.g., Canning v. Inhabitants of Williamstown, 55 Mass. 451, 452 (1848) (not-
ing that mere fright and mental suffering without a physical injury were not com-
pensable injuries).
89. See Levit, supra note 86, at 140-45; see also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAw OF DAMAGES 319-22 (1935); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible
Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 772-73 (1985); Calvert Ma-
gruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV.
1033, 1067 (1936). Some early cases, however, appear to provide recovery in spe-
cial circumstances for mental anguish without an accompanying physical injury.
See Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 F. Cas. 413, 415 (D. Mass. 1823) ("[The law]
gives compensation for mental sufferings occasioned by acts of wanton injustice,
equally whether they operate by way of direct, or of consequential injuries.");
Reed v. Davis, 21 Mass. 216, 218-19 (1826) (awarding damages for mental
anguish where plaintiffs were wrongfully evicted from their home); Vanhorn v.
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As the common law expanded to encompass emotional and rela-
tional injuries, courts began to allow claims for intentional and negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress. The stringent requirements for
those claims, however, limited their utility. Plaintiffs in intentional
infliction cases had to show that the defendant's conduct was inten-
tional or reckless and was "outrageous," namely beyond the bounds of
decency in a civilized society.90 Negligent infliction claims were
cabined by requiring that plaintiffs have some sort of physical proxim-
ity to the scene of the tortfeasor's negligence and/or some kind of rela-
tional proximity to the physically injured victims. 9 1
Disturbance of emotional tranquility was at the heart of both in-
tentional and negligent infliction claims. In allowing these claims,
courts acknowledged that individuals suffer a genuine injury when
their peace of mind is unjustifiably disturbed and that the law should
protect not only interests in bodily integrity and private property, but
also psychic interests.9 2 Humans are emotional creatures, and a civi-
Freeman, 6 N.J.L. 322, 327-28 (1796) (allowing a father to recover for the "de-
bauching" of his daughter and the mental suffering associated with it).
90. To prove a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs typi-
cally have to show four elements: (1) the wrongdoer's conduct must be intentional
or reckless; (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable; (3) the conduct
must have caused the plaintiffs emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress
must be severe. Humana of Ky., Inc. v. Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Ky. 1990). In
assessing whether or not defendant's conduct was outrageous, courts are directed
to consider whether "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the com-
munity would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
'Outrageous!'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d (1965).
91. Many negligent infliction claims have been brought by bystanders - those who
witnessed the physical injury to another but were not physically injured them-
selves. In the beginning, courts restricted such claims to those bystanders who
either received some physical impact, however slight, or who were in the "zone of
danger" and conceivably could have been physically injured. See Keck v. Jackson,
593 P.2d 668, 670 (Ariz. 1979) (applying the "zone of danger" rule); Reynolds v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(applying the impact rule). Some courts also required that the emotional distress
be manifested in physical symptoms. Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 177 N.W.2d 83, 86
(Wis. 1970). Many modern courts have abandoned the "impact" and "zone of dan-
ger" limitations but still, as one court stated, "have imposed relational, temporal,
and spatial limits on the scope of liability for emotional harm." Migliori v. Air-
borne Freight Corp., 690 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Mass. 1998). In refusing a negligent
infliction claim by an attempted rescuer of an unrelated injured victim, that court
limited bystander claims for negligent infliction to a "plaintiff who is closely re-
lated to a third person directly injured by defendant's tortious conduct, and suf-
fers emotional injuries as a result of witnessing the accident or coming upon the
third person soon after the accident." Id. In addition, a number of contemporary
courts no longer require that the plaintiff suffer physical symptoms as a result of
the emotional distress. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432,
443 (Wis. 1994).
92. One court observed that by recognizing emotional distress claims, courts have
"accepted both freedom from emotional distress as an interest worthy of protec-
tion in its own right, and the proposition that it is possible to quantify and com-
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lized society should safeguard mental wellbeing as well as physical
health.9 3 Mental anguish also has wider social ramifications and can
lead to physical ills, lost productivity, family disruption, and 'even
death.94
At the same time, by imposing fairly stringent requisites on emo-
tional distress claims, the courts are expressing some hesitancy in al-
lowing unfettered recoveries for the emotional ills that beset us, even
if those ills can be traced to another's negligent or intentionally
wrongful act. A number of traditional justifications for this hesitancy
have been put forward, many of which are discussed in greater detail
below.95 These justifications include fear of fraudulent claims, con-
cerns about disproportionate liability and excessive compensation,
and the difficulty of accurately quantifying the loss. 9 6 At bottom,
courts refusing or limiting emotional distress claims may simply dis-
like the idea of the defendant's having to recompense the plaintiff for
the latter's mental anguish untethered to any physical injury. Every-
one's life has its share of woes, and it is unclear when someone's hurt-
ful actions toward another should result in liability for the latter's
injured feelings.9 7 Each individual, it can be argued, is responsible for
maintaining his/her own psychic equilibrium.
This view of self-responsibility is certainly part of the reason that
the most common claims for intangible loss in the nineteenth century,
namely alienation of affections98 and criminal conversation,9 9had all
pensate for the invasion of that interest through an award of monetary damages."
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 817 (Cal. 1989).
93. Professor Ingber has noted that "this broadening of liability for psychic injuries
[is] parallel to the growth of a 'me-generation' striving for self-awareness, per-
sonal well-being, health, and psychic security. This cultural focus on the need for
'inner peace' and the value of psychological therapy suggests that society per-
ceives intangible injuries as real and that fairness demands that the tort system
should provide some method of redress to victims of such injuries." Stanley
Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772,
773 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
94. See, e.g., Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296 (Mass. 1978) (stating
that the mother and father of a child injured in an automobile accident allegedly
died as a result of the emotional shock of their child's accident).
95. See infra notes 260-308 and accompanying text.
96. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 (Cal. 1968) (summarizing the policy objec-
tions to claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
97. One court thoughtfully observed: "Emotional distress is an intangible condition
experienced by most persons, even absent negligence, at some time during their
lives .... That relatives [of injured persons] will have severe emotional distress
is an unavoidable aspect of the 'human condition." Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d
814, 828-29 (Cal. 1989).
98. In an action for alienation of affections, the plaintiff needs to show that the defen-
dant caused the destruction of an affectionate relationship between the plaintiff
and the plaintiffs spouse. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 (1977).
99. Criminal conversation is the defendant's adulterous liaison with the plaintiffs
spouse. Id. § 685.
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but disappeared by the mid-twentieth century. By the end of the
twentieth century, the vast majority of states had legislatively abol-
ishe'd the so-called "heart balm" tort actions.1 0 0 Although these
claims sprang from the notion of marriage as embodying property
rights - particularly, of the husband in his wife's affections - the dam-
ages awarded were based, at least in part, on the loss of the emotional
tie between the spouses. The plaintiff could recover for the loss of his
spouse's consortium in the criminal conversation action, and the loss
of her affections in the alienation action.1O'
In urging the abolition of heart balm torts, commentators cited sev-
eral policy concerns. Noting that these torts originated from outmo-
ded property-based concepts of marriage, they argued that the modern
view of marriage as a voluntary association between a man and a wo-
man was incongruent with the injured spouse's ability to recover dam-
ages from a third party for "luring away" his spouse.' 0 2 The heart
balm actions could have survived in a different form, as recompense
for the wounded feelings of the faithful spouse. But, perhaps on the
theory that the law cannot realistically compensate everyone for the
hurtful emotions engendered by others' behavior, legislatures and
courts chose to abolish such claims.1o3
While heart balm actions foundered and negligent and intentional
infliction claims developed slowly, the law has expanded fairly rapidly
and consistently with respect to compensating for the loss of a spouse
or child. Originally, English and American law did not award any
damages to the survivors of an individual wrongfully killed by an-
other.10 4 Thus, it was said to be cheaper for the tortfeasor to finish off
his/her victim than to allow that person to live and press a suit for
100. Jill Jones, Comment, Fanning an Old Flame: Alienation of Affections and Crimi-
nal Conversation Revisited, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 61, 69-70 (1998).
101. Marshall L. Davidson, III, Comment, Stealing Love in Tennessee: The Thief Goes
Free, 56 TENN. L. REV. 629, 640-42, 653 (1989).
102. See Fundermann v. Mickelson, 304 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1981) (stating that
.spousal love is not property which is subject to theft").
103. See Jennifer E. McDougal, Comment, Legislating Morality: The Actions for Alien-
ation of Affections and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 163, 183-84 (1998) (noting the incongruity of providing monetary
compensation for this type of emotional injury). See also Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669
P.2d 1207, 1228-29 (Utah 1983) (observing that the law has never recognized a
cause of action by one spouse against the other for "failure to love").
104. The roots of the English common law prohibition against wrongful death claims
can be found in the felony-merger doctrine. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Origin of
the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. Rev. 431, 432 (1916). Under this doctrine a
tort that also constituted a felony merged into the felony, essentially eliminating
the civil action for damages. See Smith v. Sykes, 89 Eng. Rep. 160, 160 (K.B.
1677). The punishment for a felony was generally the death of the felon and the
forfeiture of his property to the Crown. Thu, any tort action against the felon
would have produced no recovery. As a result of the classification of all negligent
and intentional homicides as felonies, the felony-merger doctrine eliminated all
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personal injury.1o5 Great Britain acknowledged this anomaly in the
law with the passage of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846.106 Lord Camp-
bell's Act created the first cause of action for wrongful death and al-
lowed a statutory class of survivors to recover for their pecuniary
loss. 10 7 Most often, this "pecuniary loss" took the form of earnings
and services that the decedent would have contributed to the house-
hold had he or she lived.1os
Initially, courts were reluctant to interpret the wrongful death acts
as authorizing any recovery for the emotional attachment that the
plaintiffs had enjoyed with the decedent and that had been severed by
the defendant's wrongful act.10 9 Some courts, however, allowed hus-
bands to recover for the loss of their wives' consortium, which included
affection, companionship, sexual relations, and the like.110 Eventu-
ally, most states recognized the consortium claim and equalized it to
allow wives to seek the lost consortium of their husbands who were
wrongfully killed.I"l The consortium claim also came to be recognized
where the injured victim survived with debilitating injuries. 112
Over the years, plaintiffs in wrongful death actions began to press
for expansion of the consortium claim to include other family mem-
bers. They argued that where individuals are killed, their children, as
well as their spouse, experience the loss of their affection, companion-
civil suits for wrongful death. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375, 382 (1970).
105. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 945 (5th ed.
1984).
106. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.).
107. The action was "for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the
person whose death shall have been so caused." Id.
108. See, e.g., Lustick v. Hall, 403 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (defining
pecuniary loss under Indiana law as "the reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit from the continued life of the deceased, to be inferred from proof of assis-
tance by way of money, services or other material benefits rendered by the de-
ceased prior to his death").
109. See Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 211 (N.J. 1980); Kaplan v. Sparks, 596
N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
110. Initially, the claim for lost consortium was restricted to husbands alone and was
predicated on the theory that husbands possessed a kind of property interest in
their wives: "This, then, is the soil in which the doctrine took root; the abject
subservience of wife to husband, her legal nonexistence, her degraded position as
a combination vessel, chattel, and household drudge whose obedience might be
enforced by personal chastisement." Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227,
230 (Mich. 1960).
111. As early as 1899, a state supreme court recognized that wives as well as hus-
bands should be allowed to recover for the loss of their spouse's society caused by
the spouse's wrongful death. Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Foxworth, 25 So. 338,
348 (Fla. 1899).
112. See Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 702-03 (Mass.
1980); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., Inc., 239 N.E.2d 897, 902-03
(N.Y. 1968).
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ship, guidance, and counsel.113 Similarly, parents whose child dies
because of another's negligence lose the society of that child.114 Par-
ticularly where the decedent was a child, the traditional wrongful
death recovery predicated on a pecuniary loss became increasingly
meaningless. Although children may have had some economic value
to the family unit as farm or factory workers in the nineteenth cen-
tury, in modern society children are frequently an economic liability to
their parents, requiring years of education and other financial sup-
port."15 Many states began to accept the argument that, especially in
the context of the wrongful death acts, the worth of a child decedent's
life equates primarily with the value of that child's affection and com-
panionship within the family.116
Like the position of children in society, the place of animals has
changed dramatically over the last one hundred years. Originally val-
ued almost exclusively for their income-producing capacity, animals
are now often regarded as members of the family and esteemed for the
love, loyalty, and companionship that they provide.117 Certainly,
many domestic animals, such as cattle, sheep, and chickens, are still
113. See Todd v. Sauls, 647 So. 2d 1366, 1382 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Fibreboard Corp. v.
Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 684 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
114. See, e.g., Hancock v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 54 S.W.3d 234,
236 (Tenn. 2001) (recognizing a claim for loss of filial consortium in a wrongful
death case).
115. One scholar noted the obviously fictional nature of damages for loss of a child's
services:
Honest application of a pecuniary standard does not, in today's world,
allow adequate recovery for child-death. The cost-accounting technique
for measuring damages (value of services less cost of support) is archaic
in a society which is not structured on child labor and the family chore
framework of an agricultural community .... [Bloth court and legisla-
ture have recognized that today the injury sustained by a parent on the
death of his child is not primarily economic . . . [but] emotional and
mental ....
Note, Wrongful Death of a Minor Child: The Changing Parental Injury, 43 WASH.
L. REV. 654, 655-656, 668 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
116. See Poyser v. United States, 602 F. Supp. 436, 440 (D. Mass. 1984); Gillispie v.
Beta Constr. Co., 842 P.2d 1272, 1273-74 (Alaska 1992); Johnson v. Washington
County., 506 N.W.2d 632, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Hopkins v. McBane, 427
N.W.2d 85, 92 (N.D. 1988). Some state wrongful death statutes explicitly provide
for recovery of a minor child's society. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1492(b)
(2002) ("where the decedent is a minor child, the term pecuniary injuries shall
also include the loss of love and companionship of the child and for the destruc-
tion of the parent-child relationship").
117. Although pet-keeping has often been viewed as "a largely western phenomenon,
fostered by modern urbanization, material affluence and bourgeois sentimental-
ity," this view is inaccurate. Many traditional hunting and gathering societies
keep certain animals as "social companions, as honorary members of the human
family." James Serpell & Elizabeth Paul, Pets and the Development of Positive
Attitudes to Animals, in ANIMALS AND HUMAN SOCIETY: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES
127, 129-30 (Aubrey Manning & James Serpell eds., 1994).
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valued primarily for their economic worth, but companion animals
that live in or near the family home contribute much more in terms of
their society than they do in terms of their services. 118 When an
animal dies, the human caretaker often experiences considerable grief
and anguish. 119
Courts and legislatures may choose whether to expand the reme-
dies available in pet destruction cases or to retain the status quo. In
making that choice, they inevitably will be guided by the perceived
wisdom of affording pet owners some compensation for their emotional
attachment to their pets in light of the general reluctance to afford
damages for mental suffering without physical injury. Policymakers
might ask themselves whether the loss of one's companion animal,
even through another's negligent or intentional act, is one of those
emotional traumas that one simply must endure, such as the loss of
one's spouse's affections to another or the breaking off of an engage-
ment. Or is it more akin to the anguish felt upon the negligent death
of a child or the witnessing of a profound injury to a loved one? At the
crux of the alienation of affections claim, one finds the severance of a
formerly close bond through the presumably voluntary actions of one
of the partners. 120 It is perhaps difficult to see the purpose in award-
ing damages to the injured partner in a relationship that presupposes
the willingness and mutual participation of both parties.
But plaintiffs whose animals are destroyed by the tortfeasor suffer
the involuntary disruption of their bond with their pets. In that sense,
they are more closely akin to the plaintiff who endures emotional dis-
tress because of the wrongful death of their spouse or child or because
of witnessing a devastating accident to a loved one. Both the plaintiff
and the physically injured person presumably wished to continue
their relationship, which the tortfeasor ended in wrongful death situa-
tions or damaged in non-death cases.
Even if courts and legislatures stubbornly adhere to the idea of
pets as property of their human companions, one could still justify
awarding damages for mental anguish and lost companionship in pet
destruction cases by analogizing them to nuisance actions. Although
the common law rule states that intangible damages are not available
118. See ALAN BECK & AARON KATCHER, BETWEEN PETS AND PEOPLE: THE IMPORTANCE
OF ANIMAL COMPANIONSHIP 9-33 (1996) (recounting all the main social activities
shared by individuals and their animals - eating, sleeping, playing, conversing,
and so forth).
119. See infra notes 133-138 and accompanying text.
120. In the typical situation involving alienation of affections, one spouse begins an
affair with a third person, subsequently leaves the family home, obtains a di-
vorce, and often marries the third person. See generally Jennifer E. McDougal,
Comment, Legislating Morality: The Actions for Alienation of Affections and
Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 163, 177-78
(1998) (describing litigated cases).
2004]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:783
for injuries to property interests, 12 1 there is one notable exception. In
nuisance actions, the plaintiff-landowner can recover in many juris-
dictions for the mental distress, annoyance and inconvenience, and in-
terference with use and enjoyment of the property experienced
because of the nuisance's noxious effects.122 The awards for intangi-
ble damages are often given in addition to pecuniary damages for the
property's lost rental value or lost market value.12 3
Like nuisances, pet destruction can involve intentional, reckless, or
negligent conduct on the defendant's part. Like nuisances, pet de-
struction, under the classic theory, involves an injury to the plaintiffs
property interest.12 4 Unlike ordinary personal property, companion
animals and real property share the common feature of uniqueness or
at least quasi-uniqueness. Both pets and houses often engender deep
attachments between them and their owners. As a result, both nui-
sances and pet destruction can produce considerable mental anguish
in those affected.12 5
Nuisance law already recognizes that humans, as sentient beings,
experience significant distress when exposed day after day to noxious
odors, unbearable noise, or other unreasonable interferences with the
quiet enjoyment of their land. 12 6 Awarding damages for the pecuni-
ary injury to the plaintiffs property interest does not fully compensate
the plaintiff for the emotional stress that the nuisance has caused.
121. See Bernhardt v. Ingham Reg'l Med. Ctr., 641 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002) ("Compensatory damages are not given for emotional distress caused
merely by the loss of the things.. . ."). But see Quealy v. Paine, Webber, Jackson
& Curtis, Inc., 475 So. 2d 756, 762 (La. 1985) (allowing mental anguish damages
in tortious conversion cases).
122. Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W.2d 454, 465 (Iowa 1996); Currier v. Essex Co., 189
N.E.835, 837-38 (Mass. 1934); see generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Nui-
sance as Entitling Owner or Occupant of Real Estate to Recover Damages for Per-
sonal Inconvenience, Discomfort, Annoyance, Anguish, or Sickness, Distinct from,
or in Addition to, Damages for Depreciation in Value of Property or Its Use, 25
A.L.R. 5th 568 (1994).
123. Bateman, supra note 122, at 589.
124. Nuisance is generally defined as an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs'
use and enjoyment of their property. Bates v. Quality Ready-Mix Co., 154
N.W.2d 852, 857 (Iowa 1967).
125. In a curious intersection between nuisance and pet destruction, one court held
that a landowner was justified in killing the plaintiffs trespassing dog, who "Wor-
ried" the landowner's sheep and barked incessantly, disturbing the landowner
and his family. Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 353, 359-60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840). The
dog, in essence, constituted a nuisance that the landowner could abate through
self-help. Id. at 357.
126. See, e.g., Taylor v. Leardi, 502 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516 (App. Div. 1986) (describing
tremors resulting from the defendant's nearby blasting operation); Lunda v. Mat-
thews, 613 P.2d 63, 66 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (describing intolerable dust, noise, and
diesel fumes emanating from the defendant's cement plant); Greer v. Lennox, 107
N.W.2d 337, 338 (S.D. 1961) (describing the rats, flies, and noxious odors invad-
ing the plaintiffs property).
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Thus, many courts allow nuisance plaintiffs, particularly those in resi-
dential settings, to recover an additional sum for their emotional pain
and suffering.J 27
The apparent analogies between nuisance and pet destruction
cases suggest that some award for mental anguish in the latter would
be appropriate. Homeowners in nuisance cases could presumably end
their own mental anguish by selling their property and recovering the
diminution in the fair market value of their property caused by the
nuisance. But the law does not require them to do that. It recognizes
that plaintiffs may have particular attachments to their homes, that
each piece of real property has its own unique features, and that
plaintiffs should not be required to move to get relief from the
nuisance.
As will be discussed more fully in the next section,' 28 pet owners
often have intense and deep attachments to their animals. As in a
nuisance situation, the plaintiffs in pet destruction cases will fre-
quently suffer considerable disturbance of their emotional tranquility
because of the defendant's tortious conduct. As with real property,
each animal has its unique qualities that cannot be replicated entirely
in a replacement companion. Full and complete compensation of a pet
owner requires that there be some recompense for the plaintiffs intan-
gible losses.
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
HUMAN-ANIMAL BOND
Domestication of non-human animals, it is believed, began 12,000
years ago, most likely through communal hunting and scavenging ac-
tivities by humans and wolves or wolf-like ancestral dogs.129 Cats
were much more recently domesticated, becoming an essential part of
Egyptian society by 1600 B.C.130 In addition to being valued for their
companionship, dogs, cats, and other domestic animals were also
working animals serving a variety of functions from guarding to herd-
ing and even pest control.1 31
Modern social science research bolsters the intuitive notion that
companion animals hold great significance for their human guardians,
provide a host of psychosocial and medical benefits to their owners,
and produce considerable feelings of grief and loss in their human
127. See, e.g., Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 466 (upholding $45,000 award for the plain-
tiffs' annoyance, discomfort, and loss of full enjoyment of their property caused by
the defendants' hog feeding operation).
128. See infra notes 133-169 and accompanying text.
129. Margaret Sery Young, The Evolution of Domestic Pets and Companion Animals,
15 VETERINARY CLINICS No. AM. SMALL ANIMAL PRACTICE 297, 302-03 (1985).
130. Id. at 306.
131. Id. at 304.
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caretakers when they die or disappear. Such research argues for at
least some meaningful legal compensation when a companion animal
is negligently or intentionally destroyed. Upon a pet's death, humans
generally experience a substantial and genuine loss-a loss of both
the positive benefits of the relationship and a certain amount of emo-
tional tranquility.132
A number of social scientific studies have found that people suffer
emotional distress after a pet's demise similar to that endured when a
human family member dies.13 3 Pet owners go through all the stages
of grief experienced when close friends or relatives die.'34 The emo-
tional distress is particularly acute when the pet's death is sudden
and unexpected,13 5 and individuals whose primary relationships are
with their pets especially suffer.136 The reason for the profound sad-
ness felt in these situations is that, as studies have shown, people de-
velop strong and enduring relationships with their companion
animals 137 and an individual's bond with a particular animal is
unique. 138 As a result, procuring another companion animal does not
entirely assuage the grief suffered as a result of the previous animal's
death.
Further, investigators have reported that companion animals
serve a myriad of functions in humans' lives: they are playmates,
132. One pet owner poignantly described her intimate bond with her cat:
When asked why she was so upset and crying, she stated that her cat,
Fluffy, had died that morning. "Oh," said the therapist, "I am sorry to
hear that." "But you do not realize how close Fluffy was to me," said the
patient. "She was just like my own fur and bones."
James M. Harris, Nonconventional Human/Companion Animal Bonds, in PET
Loss AND HUMAN BEREAVEMENT 31, 33 (William J. Kay et al. eds., 1984).
133. See Boris M. Levinson, Grief at the Loss of a Pet, in PET Loss AND HUMAN BE-
REAVEMENT 51-64 (William J. Kay et al. eds., 1984) (citing several studies).
134. See Alton F. Hopkins, Pet Death: Effects on the Client and the Veterinarian, in
THE PET CONNECTION: ITS INFLUENCE ON OUR HEALTH AND QUALITY OF LIFE 276-
282 (Robert K. Anderson et al. eds., 1984) (discussing Elizabeth Kubler-Ross'
classic work on the stages of grief in the context of pet loss).
135. LAUREL LAGONI ET AL., THE HUMAN-ANIMAL BOND AND GRIEF 76 (1994). The grief
experienced by pet owners can be particularly intense when someone killed their
pet intentionally. One owner interviewed by a researcher stated: "[i]t's bad
enough when you lose a dog, but it's even more upsetting to lose a dog for no good
reason. What do you expect if your animal is murdered? You hurt so much for so
long." Arnold Arluke, Secondary Victimization in Companion Animal Abuse: The
Owner's Perspective, in COMPANION ANIMALS AND Us: EXPLORING THE RELATION-
SHIPS BETWEEN PEOPLE AND PETS 275, 282-83 (Anthony L. Podberscek et al. eds.,
2000).
136. Michael Stern, Exploring the Bond: Psychological Elements of Attachment to Pets
and Responses to Pet Loss, 209 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1707, 1708 (1996).
137. See Betty J. Carmack, The Effects on Family Members and Functioning After the
Death of a Pet, in PETS AND THE FAMILY 149 (Marvin B. Sussman ed., 1985) (refer-
encing social science studies describing the closeness of the human-animal bond).
138. Id. at 152-54 (citing examples of unique relationships with pets).
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friends, confidants, helpers, and protectors, among other roles. 139
They are often regarded as members of their human families, 14 0 and
they confer measurable benefits upon their human caretakers. Sev-
eral social science studies have demonstrated that companion animals
can significantly improve the quality of life for children, non-senior
adults, and elderly individuals.141
In particular, pets can facilitate emotional and social development
in children by providing uncritical and nonjudgmental affection and
by fostering nurturing skills.142 Some clinicians working with chil-
dren have posited that pet ownership assists children in fulfilling
several of Erik Erikson's classic stages of psychosocial develop-
ment:143 trust, autonomy, industry, and identity.'4 4 In addition, chil-
dren with pets have scored higher, in some studies, on measures of
empathy, self-esteem, and self-concept than those without companion
animals.145 Researchers have also discovered that pet ownership dur-
ing childhood can ameliorate the effects of sexual abuse. Some child-
hood sexual abuse survivors report that a companion animal was the
only supportive creature in their lives as children. 14 6 Further, re-
searchers have found that sexual abuse survivors who had pets as
children were less likely to become abusers themselves and exper-
139. Bernard E. Rollin, The Moral Status of Animals, in PET Loss AND HUMAN BE-
REAvEMENT 3, 9-10 (William J. Kay et al. eds., 1984).
140. See Lynette A. Hart, Dogs as Human Companions: A Review of the Relationship,
in THE DOMESTIC DOG: ITS EVOLUTION, BEHAVIOUR, AND INTERACTIONS WITH PEO-
PLE 161, 163 (James Serpell ed., 1995).
141. See infra notes 142-157 and accompanying text.
142. See COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, COMPANION ANIMALS IN SOCIETY 25-28
(1988).
143. For a description of Erikson's stages of psychosocial development in children, see
ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 247-63 (2d ed. 1963).
144. A pet's constancy and affection promote trust; its willingness to interact and play
with a child encourages autonomy and initiative; its trainability enables a child
to develop a sense of industry; and its ability to provide emotional support and
companionship strengthens a child's identity. See Gladys F. Blue, The Value of
Pets in Children's Lives, 63 CHILDHOOD EDUC. 84, 86-87 (1986); Brenda H. Brown
et al., Pet Bonding and Pet Bereavement Among Adolescents, 74 J. COUNSELING &
DEV. 505, 505 (1996); Brenda K Bryant, The Richness of the Child-Pet Relation-
ship: A Consideration of Both Benefits and Costs of Pets to Children, 3 AN-
THROZOOs 253, 255 (1990); Michael Robin & Robert ten Bensel, Pets and the
Socialization of Children, 11 LATHAM LETTER 1, 17 (1990).
145. See Robert H. Poresky & Charles Hendrix, Differential Effects of Pet Presence and
Pet-Bonding on Young Children, 67 PSYCHOL. REP. 51, 53-54 (1990); Beth A. Van
Houtte & Patricia A. Jarvis, The Role of Pets in Preadolescent Psychosocial Devel-
opment, 16 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 463, 476-77 (1995).
146. Sandra B. Barker et al., The Use of the Family Life Space Diagram in Establish-
ing Interconnectedness: A Preliminary Study of Sexual Abuse Survivors, Their
Significant Others, and Pets, 53 INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOL. 435, 445 (1997).
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ienced less anger than those victims of abuse who did not have a
strong bond with an animal as children.147
The benefits of pet ownership extend also to adults, both seniors
and non-seniors. With adults, domestic animals can provide compan-
ionship, engender emotional expression, and break down bdrriers to
trust.148 In a family setting, pets have been found to increase family
adaptabilityl4 9 and to reduce stress among family members. 15 0 In the
wider world, pets facilitate interaction among strangers and reduce
the anonymity and isolation that characterize contemporary urban
living.151
The elderly, in particular, benefit from the unconditional accept-
ance offered by companion animals, and pets can keep older adults
active and engaged in life by giving them someone for whom to
care. 152 Social science research has shown that elderly individuals,
both those living in nursing homes and those living in the community,
enjoy increased social interactions, 15 3 better health, 154 and improved
147. Sandra B. Barker, Therapeutic Aspects of the Human-Companion Animal Inter-
action, 16 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p990243.html
(1999).
148. See generally E.K. Rynearson, Humans and Pets and Attachment, 133 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 550, 553-54 (1978) (discussing the significance of pets as attachment
figures); R. Lee Zasloff & Aline H. Kidd, Loneliness and Pet Ownership Among
Single Women, 75 PSYCHOL. REP. 747, 750 (1994) (demonstrating that women liv-
ing entirely alone are lonelier than women living with either pets or other peo-
ple). One author described the uninhibited nature of the human-cat relationship:
"... the stroking, cuddling and the exchange of 'caresses' are in no way taboo.
There are no dictates or prohibitions standing in the way of letting go of feelings;
there is no need to repress anything - one is free to admit to one's emotions ...."
REINHOLD BERGLER, MAN AND CAT: THE BENEFITS OF CAT OWNERSHIP 54 (1989).
149. Ruth P. Cox, The Human-Animal Bond as a Correlate of Family Functioning, 2
CLINICAL NURSING RES. 224, 228-29 (1993).
150. See Karen M. Allen et al., Presence of Human Friends and Pet Dogs as Modera-
tors of Autonomic Responses to Stress in Women, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SoC.
PSYCHOL. 582, 587 (1991); Janet Haggerty Davis, Pet Ownership and Stress Over
the Family Life Cycle, 5 HOLISTIC NURSING PRAC. 52, 54-55 (1991).
151. See Susan J. Hart et al., Role of Small Animals in Social Interaction Between
Strangers, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 245, 253-55 (1992); Douglas M. Robins et al.,
Dogs and Their People, Pet- Facilitated Interaction in a Public Setting, 20 J. CON-
TEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 3, 21-23 (1991).
152. ODEAN CUSACK & ELAINE SMITH, PETS AND THE ELDERLY: THE THERAPEUTIC BOND
35-41 (1984). The authors observed that "[a] dog doesn't care if its master is
beautiful, rich, young, or healthy; it will accept a tender stroke from an aged
trembling hand as enthusiastically as from that of a young and able athlete." Id.
at 36.
153. See Katharine M. Fick, The Influence of an Animal on Social Interactions of Nurs-
ing Home Residents in a Group Setting, 47 AM. J. OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY 529,
532 (1993); Peter 0. Peretti, Elderly-Animal Friendship Bonds, 18 Soc. BEHAVIOR
& PERSONALITY 151, 154-55 (1990); Anne Winkler et al., The Impact of a Resident
Dog on an Institution for the Elderly: Effects on Perceptions and Social Interac-
tions, 29 GERONTOLOGIST 216, 222-23 (1989).
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morale55 when they own pets or have them as regular visitors. In one
nursing home study, the home's director had created a humane envi-
ronment in which the residents had various birds living in their rooms
and also had the company of several resident animals, including cats,
dogs, rabbits, and chickens.156 In comparison with a control group
consisting of residents in a nearby home, these residents dramatically
decreased their dependence on psychotropic drugs and had a lower
mortality rate over a two-year period.I57
Several social science studies have demonstrated that companion
animals have beneficial effects on human health, both physical and
mental. Studies of patients with coronary disease have shown that
those with pets generally survived longer than those without pets.158
An Australian study of over 5,700 pet owners found that male pet
owners had significantly lower systolic blood pressure and triglyceride
and cholesterol levels than male non-pet owners.' 5 9 In another study,
the mere act of petting one's own dog had the effect of significantly
lowering the subject's blood pressure.160
154. See Karen Allen, Social Support and Resting Blood Pressure Among Young and
Elderly Women: The Moderating Role of Dogs and Cats, 59 PSYCHOSOMATIC
MEDICINE 94, 94 (1997); Diane Dembicki & Jennifer Anderson, Pet Ownership
May be a Factor in Improved Health of the Elderly, 15 J. NUTRITION FOR THE
ELDERLY 15, 28-29 (1996); Dan Lago et al., Companion Animals, Attitudes To-
ward Pets, and Health Outcomes Among the Elderly: A Long-Term Follow-Up, 3
ANTHROZOoS 25, 29 (1989).
155. See generally Peter 0. Peretti, Elderly-Animal Friendship Bonds, 18 Soc. BEHAV-
IOR & PERSONALITY 151, 154 (1990) (demonstrating that pets provide elderly per-
sons living alone with friendship and seem to fulfill a human need to nurture);
Judith M. Siegel, Stressful Life Events and Use of Physician Services Among the
Elderly: The Moderating Role of Pet Ownership, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
1081, 1084-85 (1990) (showing that elderly persons without pets have more doc-
tor contacts during stressful life events than those with pets).
156. WILLIAM H. THOMAS, THE EDEN ALTERNATIVE: NATURE, HOPE AND NURSING
HOMES 35-45 (1994).
157. Id. at 47-67; see also WILLIAM H. THOMAS, LIFE WORTH LIVING: How SOMEONE
You LovE CAN STILL ENJOY LIFE IN A NURSING HOME: THE EDEN ALTERNATIVE IN
ACTION 47-59 (1996).
158. ALAN BECK & AARON KATCHER, BETWEEN PETS AND PEOPLE: THE IMPORTANCE OF
ANIMAL COMPANIONSHIP 2-6 (1996); Erika Friedman et al., Animal Companions
and One-Year Survival of Patients After Discharge from a Coronary Care Unit, 95
PUB. HEALTH REP. 307, 310-11 (1980). Drs. Beck and Katcher stated that "[tihe
mortality rate among people with pets seemed to be one-third that of patients
without pets." BECK & KATCHER, supra, at 4. Even adjusting for the possibility
that individuals with less severe coronary disease were more likely to own pets,
the study still concluded that pet ownership decreased the likelihood of death by
about three percent. Id. at 4-5.
159. W.P. Anderson et al., Pet Ownership and Risk Factors for Cardiovascular Dis-
ease, 157 MED. J. AUSTRALIA 298, 300 (1992).
160. Mara M. Baun et al., Physiological Effects of Petting Dogs: Influences of Attach-
ment, in THE PET CONNECTION: ITS INFLUENCE ON OUR HEALTH AND QUALITY OF
LIFE 162, 168 (Robert K. Anderson et al. eds., 1984).
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For years, highly trained companion animals have assisted persons
with physical disabilities by enabling them to participate more fully in
the workplace, in daily living, and in society in general. Service dogs
function as "eyes" for the blind, warn epileptics of impending seizures,
and perform tasks for individuals with muscular or arthritic condi-
tions. 16 1 Canine companions can also aid hearing-impaired persons
by alerting them to household sounds such as the telephone or a cry-
ing baby,16 2 and equine therapy is routinely used to build strength
and coordination in individuals with cerebral palsy and other neuro-
muscular conditions.16 3 Capuchin monkeys can even be trained to as-
sist quadriplegics with routine household tasks.164
In addition, pets can ameliorate the condition of individuals with
mental health problems and mental disabilities. 16 5 Animal-assisted
therapy has been found useful in treating autistic children, 166 as well
as children with attention deficit and conduct disorders.167 Research-
ers have also discovered that such therapy reduces anxiety in patients
with mood and other psychiatric disorders.168 In traditional psycho-
therapy sessions, companion animals can serve as a bridge between
therapist and patient by reducing the threat and pain of the therapy
session. 169
161. See Susan L. Duncan & Karen Allen, Service Animals and Their Roles in Enhanc-
ing Independence, Quality of Life, and Employment for People with Disabilities,
in HANDBOOK ON ANIMAL-AssISTED THERAPY: THEORETICAL AND GUIDELINES FOR
PRACTICE 303, 308-10 (Aubrey H. Fine ed., 2000).
162. Bonita M. Bergin, Companion Animals for the Handicapped, in DYNAMIC RELA-
TIONSHIPS IN PRACTICE: ANIMALS IN THE HELPING PROFESSIONS 191, 198-200 (Phil
Arkow ed., 1984).
163. Karen P. DePauw, Therapeutic Horseback Riding in Europe and North America,
in THE PET CONNECTION: ITS INFLUENCE ON OUR HEALTH AND QUALITY OF LIFE
141-53 (Robert K. Anderson et al. eds., 1984).
164. Steven H. Foskett, Jr., Helping the Disabled: Group Raises Capuchin Monkeys to
Aid Quadriplegics, WORCHESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Apr. 24, 2002, at B1.
165. See Janush v. Charities Hous. Dev. Corp., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1134 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (noting psychiatrist's testimony that plaintiffs two birds and two cats less-
ened the effects of her mental health disability). For a general description of
animal-assisted therapy ("AAT"), see ALAN BECK & AARON KATCHER, BETWEEN
PETS AND PEOPLE: THE IMPORTANCE OF ANIMAL COMPANIONSHIP 125-159 (1996).
166. See Boris M. Levinson, The Dog as a "Co-Therapist," 46 MENTAL HYGIENE 59, 59-
65 (1962).
167. Aaron Katcher & Gregory G. Wilkins, Helping Children with Attention-Deficit
Hyperactive and Conduct Disorders Through Animal-Assisted Therapy and Edu-
cation, 12 INTERACTIONS 5, 7-8 (1994).
168. Sandra B. Barker & Kathryn S. Dawson, The Effects of Animal-Assisted Therapy
on Anxiety Ratings of Hospitalized Psychiatric Patients, 49 PSYCHIATRY SERV.
797, 800-01 (1998).
169. See BORIS M. LEVINSON & GERALD P. MALLON, PET-ORIENTED CHILD PSYCHOTHER-
APY 67-75 (2d ed. 1997); Alan M. Beck et al., Use of Animals in the Rehabilitation
of Psychiatric Inpatients, 58 PSYCHOL. REP. 63, 63-66 (1986); Margaret S. Mason
& Christine B. Hagan, Pet-Assisted Psychotherapy, 84 PSYCHOL. REP. 1235, 1240-
42 (1999).
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The depth, uniqueness, and multi-dimensional quality of the
human-pet relationship all suggest that legal compensation for the
tortious destruction of companion animals should account for the rela-
tionship's intangible aspects. Just as tort law has evolved to compen-
sate for the intangible aspects of other family relationships,17o it
should now be modernized to allow recoveries for the emotional ties
lost when a pet dies prematurely. The argument in favor of compensa-
tion for emotional loss is strengthened in the companion animal con-
text because of the extremely low pecuniary damages sustained by
most pet owners. 17 1 In contrast, a surviving spouse suing for the
wrongful death of her husband can expect, in many cases, to recover
substantial sums for the loss of his earnings and the value of his lost
services.172
V. A PROPOSAL FOR VALUING COMPANION ANIMALS
A. General Policy Considerations
Undoubtedly, both judicial and legislative lawmakers will greet
with skepticism any proposal to expand the intangible damages avail-
able to plaintiffs whose companion animals are tortiously killed.
Thus, any concept of "appropriate legal valuation" of companion ani-
mals that I might develop must be supportable through reason and
policy and must also address several policy concerns. As a society, we
could value our bonds with companion animals but decide that social
policy considerations militate against awarding damages for the in-
tangible losses that pet owners suffer upon their animals' tortious
destruction.173
One of the traditional objections to recognizing expanded awards
for the loss of pet animals that include an emotional distress compo-
nent is that it will open the proverbial Pandora's box and result in
inflated and even fraudulent claims for the death of a pet.17 4 A re-
lated objection is that large damage awards for pets are simply over-
compensatory and have an economically distorting effect. In other
words, defendants may be deterred from pursuing economically useful
170. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 39, 50-51, and accompanying text.
172. For calculations as to the future lost earnings of individuals in various profes-
sional and business-related occupations, see STuART M. SPEISER & JOHN MAHER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY: ECONOMIC HANDBOOK, chs. 8 & 9
(4th ed. 1995).
173. Cf Sizemore v. Smock, 422 N.W.2d 666, 670-71 (Mich. 1988) (arguing that the
inherent value of the parent-child relationship does not mean that a cause of ac-
tion for loss of filial society should be recognized).
174. See Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1145 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001); John-
son v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (Sup. Ct. 2001); Rabideau v. Racine, 627
N.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Wis. 2001).
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activities because of the specter of having to pay substantial sums to
pet owners for their emotional distress when the pet owners can sim-
ply ameliorate their loss by procuring another cat or dog at nominal
expense. 175 In addition, it is difficult to avoid gross inconsistencies in
awards from case to case, given the nebulous nature of emotional
attachment. 176
In addition, one possible difficulty in analogizing a claim for pet
loss to those for wrongful death is that the class of wrongful death
claimants is generally limited by statute, usually to immediate family
members. In other words, the law does not currently afford compensa-
tion for friends, co-workers, cousins, and other non-immediate rela-
tives of the decedent who is wrongfully killed by another.177 If my
best friend, who has no immediate family, is killed because of an-
other's negligent, reckless, or intentional act, ordinarily, I will receive
no compensation for the emotional distress that I suffer because of the
loss of my friend. In fact, if an individual has no immediate family at
the time of his/her death, there may be no statutory plaintiff to bring a
wrongful death action, and the death of that individual may go largely
unrecompensed.178
175. Veterinarians, in particular, worry about the increased cost of malpractice insur-
ance if they can be held liable for a pet owner's emotional distress. See Julie
Scelfo, Good Dogs, Bad Medicine?, NEWSWEEK, May 21, 2001, at 52, 53. They
argue that veterinary malpractice is rare and that incompetent veterinarians are
weeded out by state licensing boards. See Bonnie Beresford, Letter to the Editor,
NEWSWEEK, June 11, 2001, at 14, 16.
176. See Harabes, 791 A.2d at 1145 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001) (observing the "difficulty in
quantifying the emotional value of a companion pet and the risk that a negligent
tortfeasor will be exposed to extraordinary and unrealistic damage claims").
177. Wrongful death statutes typically designate particular relatives of the decedent -
usually, spouse, children, parents, and/or siblings - who are entitled to compen-
sation for their relative's death. More remote relatives and non-relatives are gen-
erally excluded. See, e.g., In re Estate of Poole, 767 N.E.2d 855, 861 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) (stating that the decedent's grandparents were not entitled to bring wrong-
ful death action); Henderson v. Fields, 68 S.W.3d 455, 464 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(same). But see Shelton v. DeWitte, 26 P.3d 650, 654 (Kan. 2001) (allowing the
decedent's grandparents to bring a wrongful death action where the decedent's
mother was dead and her natural father chose not to pursue the action). See also
Elizabeth Trainor, Annotation, Who, Other Than Parent, May Recover for Loss of
Consortium on Death of Minor Child, 84 A.L.R. 5th 687, 687 (2000) (noting that a
minority of courts have allowed siblings and grandparents to recover under
wrongful death acts for loss of consortium).
178. See, e.g., Hindry v. Holt, 51 P. 1002, 1004 (Colo. 1897) (holding that the niece of
the decedent, a thirty-eight-year old unmarried laborer, could not bring a wrong-
ful death action even though she was the decedent's only heir). In an effort to
value more completely an individual's life, some attorneys have argued that in
death cases the decedent's estate or survivors should recover "hedonic damages,"
representing the value of the decedent's life to himself. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F.
Supp. 159, 163-64 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd en
banc on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988). They have proffered theo-
ries for valuing an individual's life based on the wages paid to workers in hazard-
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Given those limitations on wrongful death recovery, it is debatable
whether awarding wrongful death-type damages in pet destruction
cases is consistent with current wrongful death schemes. If a pet is
considered simply another friend (albeit nonhuman), then wrongful
death theory would dictate no recovery. But pets arguably occupy a
role greater than that of friend-they are intimate companions, mem-
bers of the human companion's family.179 If my friend dies, in most
cases there will be a surviving spouse, children, or parents to seek
compensation for lost companionship under the state wrongful death
statute.18 0 If a companion animal dies, the most logical plaintiff is the
animal's primary caregiver. Or if the animal was a family pet, then
arguably the damages should be based on the loss to the family unit,
without distinguishing among individual members of the family.181
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to recognize claims for
emotional distress and mental anguish in a variety of contexts. As
mentioned above,1 8 2 they have advanced various policy concerns to
justify this reluctance - concerns that I will explore more deeply
later.'8 3 Thus, in many cases, the courts either have refused to recog-
nize a particular type of claim for emotional distressl8 4 or have con-
fined such claims to a certain limited class of plaintiffs.185
Counterbalancing these concerns are the traditional tort law policy
justifications of compensation, deterrence, and reflection of societal
values.186 Ideally, damages should compensate injured parties in
such a way as to make them whole-i.e., without overcompensating
ous occupations and on the prices that consumer will pay for additional safety
devices. Stanley V. Smith, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 74 A.B.A.
J. 70 (1988). Only a few courts have recognized such claims, and the federal
courts exclude testimony based on these theories as unscientific and unreliable.
See Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (collecting
cases).
179. See Cecelia J. Soares, The Companion Animal in the Context of the Family Sys-
tem, in PETS AND THE FAMILY 49-62 (Marvin B. Sussman ed., 1985).
180. In a recent case involving the priest held captive by Islamic radicals for ten
months, the priest's nieces and nephews have sought to recover damages under a
federal statute authorizing relatives of terrorism victims to recover for their
mental anguish and grief. William Glaberson, Court Case Seeks to Define a Cath-
olic Priest's Family, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2001, at A10. The plaintiffs are arguing
that because a priest normally will not have any children, they are the theoretical
and actual substitute and should be within the circle of relatives entitled to dam-
ages. Id.
181. See infra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 259-308 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
186. See ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAw: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE 202 (1995) ("[W]e must assess [tort law] as an instrument of compensa-
tion, deterrence, and public admonition.") (footnote omitted).
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them or undercompensating them.18 7 Additionally, damages should
deter the tortfeasor and others similarly situated from engaging in the
tortious conduct that produced the injury in the first place.1 8 8 Finally,
tort law in general seeks to effectuate social values and goals by en-
couraging certain types of behavior, discouraging other types of behav-
ior, and providing redress for those who have been injured by conduct
that society deems wrongful in some way.189
Woven into these traditional tort policy justifications are the poli-
cies underpinning damages theory,19o which are primarily corrective
justice and economic efficiency. Proponents of corrective justice, first
espoused by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics,191 argue that in-
jured victims are entitled to be placed in their original position-i.e.,
187. Warren A. Seavey, Book Review, 45 HARv. L. REV. 209, 211-12 (1931) ("Tort lia-
bility ... exists chiefly to compensate an individual, as nearly as may be, for loss
caused by the defendant's conduct, either by making the financial position of the
plaintiff as good as it was before, or would have been if the defendant had not
acted, by giving balm for his wounded pride or damaged body or by doing both.").
However easily stated, this principle is much more difficult to put into practice.
Courts and legislatures must determine what are legally recognized injuries, and
judges and juries must figure out a way of measuring loss. See Jules L. Coleman,
The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW
57 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
188. See RICARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 220 (5th ed. 1998) (stating
that the economic function of the negligence system is "the deterrence of ineffi-
cient accidents").
189. See P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION, AND THE LAw 467 (1970) (observing
that negligence law always begins with the question "has the defendant done
something wrong?"); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 301 (1970) (not-
ing that one of the principal underpinnings of tort law has been the notion that
"acts that we deem wrong and immoral" be suitably punished); Richard Wright,
Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IowA L. REV. 625, 689 (1992) (stating that
"Ithe law requires us to practice virtue and avoid vice in all our relations with
others by commanding some acts and forbidding others").
190. Damages theory, of course, encompasses damages afforded in a variety of sub-
stantive claims - e.g., tort, contract, statutory causes of action, and so forth. See
DOUG RENDLEMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 1-4 (6th ed. 1999). Tort
theory, in some sense, concerns the imposition of legal liability whereas damages
(or remedial) theory focuses on the measurement of that liability once it has been
imposed.
191. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. 2, at 85 (Roger Crisp trans. & ed.,
2000) (stating that corrective justice "plays a rectifying part in transactions").
Aristotle lays out his theory of corrective justice in more detail in chapter 4 of
Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics:
What is just in transactions is nevertheless a kind of equality, and what
is unjust a kind of inequality .... For it makes no difference whether it
is a good person who had defrauded a bad or a bad person a good ....
The law looks only to the difference made by the injury, and treats the
parties as equals, if one is committing injustice, and the other suffering
it-that is, if one has harmed and the other been harmed. So the judge,
since this kind of injustice is an inequality, tries to equalize it.
Id. bk. V, ch. 4, at 87.
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their position before the injury.19 2 In cases where direct pecuniary
harm has occurred, an award of money damages will serve readily to
put the victim in that position.193 The damages, however, must be
calibrated to restore plaintiffs only to their pre-injury position, no
more or less. To do less would result in leaving the plaintiffs injury
not fully redressed; to do more would produce an unjustified shift of
resources from the defendant wrongdoer to the plaintiff-i.e., a wind-
fall gain.194
The theory of economic efficiency views the law as a tool to promote
beneficial activities by encouraging those that are economically effi-
cient and discouraging those that are economically inefficient.1 95 Eco-
nomic efficiency, in this view, is a close proxy for societal good. Actors
in the economic marketplace can produce a profit only by providing a
good or service for which individuals are willing to pay a certain
amount. Buyers will pay that amount only if they perceive the com-
modity being sold as producing a benefit' 96 to them that equals or
192. See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distrib-
utive Justice, 77 IowA L. REV. 515, 530 (1992) (noting that corrective justice, in
contemporary thought, concerns itself with the "rectification of violations of enti-
tlements caused by persons in their interactions with each other"); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IowA L. REV. 403, 408 (1992) (observing that cor-
rective justice "focuses on a quantity that represents what rightfully belongs to
one party but is now wrongly possessed by another party and therefore must be
shifted back to its rightful owner"); Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective
Justice, 77 IowA L. REv. 625, 692 (1992) (pointing out that Aristotle's theory of
corrective justice requires judges to restore the preexisting equality between two
parties by "imposing a duty on the injurer to disgorge any unjust gain and to
compensate the injured for any unjust loss").
193. In a simple example, if A converts $50 in cash belonging to B, then A can restore
B to his ex ante position by paying him $50 (plus interest). Haines v. Parra, 239
Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (1987).
194. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 281 (2d ed. 1993) ("The stated goal of the
damages remedy is compensation for legally recognized losses. This means that
the plaintiff should be fully indemnified for his loss, but that he should not re-
cover any windfall.") (footnote omitted).
195. Economic efficiency is often defined according to the Kaldor-Hicks theory in
which "a policy change is said to be efficient if the winners from the change could
compensate the losers, that is, if the winners gain more from the change than the
losers lose, whether or not there is actual compensation." WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 16 (1987); see also
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1094 (1972) (dis-
cussing economic efficiency in terms of Pareto optimality).
196. The benefit produced may not be strictly pecuniary; it could be emotional or psy-
chological. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philo-
sophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (David G.
Owen ed. 1995) (including in his theory of "wealth maximization" the value of
non-economic goods such as "life, leisure, family, and freedom from pain and
suffering").
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exceeds the purchase price.19 7 In applying economic efficiency ideas
to legal remedies, commentators have argued that the main purpose of
compensatory damages is to force individuals to pay for the unjust
harms they have inflicted on others-by so doing, they more fully bear
the true cost of their activity.198 If they can still make a profit even
after paying for those harms, then, theoretically, they should be al-
lowed to continue their activity-i.e., the total benefit of their activity
presumably outweighs its total cost. 199
Any scheme that provides compensation for the emotional attach-
ment that humans feel for their companion animals should reflect the
traditional policy justifications and answer the policy concerns out-
lined above. Emotional distress damages for pet loss advance the
goals of compensation, deterrence, and reflection of societal values.
They also can be harmonized with the theories of corrective justice
and economic efficiency. At the same time, a damages remedy for pet
loss that includes an intangible component can be fashioned so as to
reduce the possibility of fraudulent claims, keep overall tort liability
in proportion to fault, provide guidance to triers of fact in assigning an
appropriate monetary amount, and address the impact on the cost of
veterinary care and other activities.
B. The Inadequacy of the Current Legal Rules for Animal
Valuation
As mentioned above, 200 the current majority rule for valuing com-
panion animals at their fair market value produces significant un-
dercompensation of the guardians of such animals. Apart from
purebred animals or those with special skills,201 such as service dogs,
197. See DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY
TO POLICY 35 (4th ed. 1993) (discussing the concept of consumer surplus as "the
total benefit of a given amount of a good less the value of money given up to
obtain the monthly quantity"); JOHN M. LEVY, ESSENTIAL MICROECONOMICS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 23 (1995) (noting that the consumer, "whom we assume
to be rational and self-interested ... will continue to buy the item as long as the
value (to the consumer) of the marginal item is greater than the price").
198. See Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
13, 13-14 (1972) (describing the conventional economic analysis of social cost ver-
sus private cost).
199. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,
70 YALE L.J. 499, 544 (1961) (noting that the prices of goods are too low when
they fail to reflect accident costs); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries:
A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 793-94 (1985) (observing that
"[flailure to internalize all accident costs, then, amounts to a subsidy for high-risk
goods and services, and an indirect subsidy for accidents").
200. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Paguio v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 21 A.2d 667, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1941)
(awarding plaintiff $500 for loss of dog that originally cost $100 but had been
specially trained to perform on stage).
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most companion animals have negligible fair market value. Most
owners would not sell their mature companion animals at any
price,20 2 and most individuals seeking to acquire a young animal need
pay nothing or only a nominal amount to obtain, say, a puppy or kit-
ten, from a neighbor, friend, or animal shelter. In other words,
humans who are deeply attached to their animals will not part with
them for any sum of money, 20 3 and because of the excess supply of
unwanted animals, most would-be buyers can pay virtually nothing to
obtain one. Given that fair market value is defined as what a willing
seller would accept for an item and what a willing buyer would give
for that item, arguably the typical companion animal has no fair mar-
ket value.
There are several traditional justifications for using fair market
value as the standard of compensation for destroyed personal prop-
erty. First, it usually represents the amount that the plaintiff will
have to pay to replace the lost property. As such, it constitutes true
compensation because the plaintiff may go into the market place and
buy substitute property to replace the item that was converted or de-
stroyed. Thus, tort plaintiffs are restored to their pre-tort position.
Second, even if the plaintiff does not choose to replace the lost item,
fair market value represents the loss to the plaintiffs net worth. For
example, before the tort, the plaintiff may have owned an automobile
worth $5,000 in the marketplace, whereas after the tort, the plaintiffs
"balance sheet" has been diminished by that amount. Once again,
awarding the fair market value of the automobile restores the plain-
tiffs ex ante. economic position.
These traditional justifications for the fair market value standard
do not apply to compensation for companion animals. If the fair mar-
ket value of the typical companion animal is close to zero, the plaintiff
whose animal has been destroyed can procure a substitute in the mar-
ketplace for a nominal sum. But procuring a new animal will not
erase the mental anguish and grief experienced when the previous
animal was killed. In addition, it may take some time before the
plaintiff can acquire a suitable replacement animal and develop the
same depth of bond that the plaintiff enjoyed with the previous
animal. In some sense, each animal-human relationship is unique
and carries with it individualized feelings and ways of
communicating.
202. See Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Iowa 1996) (noting that
plaintiffs expert testified that the value of a pet who is regarded as a family
member "could be as high as the national debt").
203. In addition, most people would not be interested in buying someone else's pet,
unless it were a purebred animal or one with special skills. Mitchell v. Hein-
richs, 27 P.3d 309, 311 (Alaska 2001).
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In the same vein, the current wrongful death cases recognize the
uniqueness of certain types of human relationships. In most states, a
man whose wife is wrongfully killed by another may recover for the
loss of his wife's consortium even though post-tort he is able to re-
marry.20 4 Similarly, parents may receive damages for the loss of their
child's society even though they have other children or they now have,
because of their child's death, the economic wherewithal to have an-
other child.205 The premise behind these rules is that one human be-
ing does not substitute for another and that one relationship does not
replace another. The same premise holds true to some extent for com-
panion animal-human relationships: one animal does not entirely re-
place another though a subsequent animal can fulfill many of same
companionate functions served by the previous animal.
Courts that have recognized the inadequacy of the fair market
value standard in animal destruction cases have often adopted the
"value to the owner" approach outlined above. Courts using this ap-
proach attempt to gauge how much destroyed personal property is
worth to its owner apart from the item's value in the marketplace.
But even under this approach, the focus is most often on economic con-
siderations. Courts attempt to determine a chattel's value to its
owner by examining its cost when new, the extent of its depreciation,
its replacement cost, its incoming producing capacity, and so forth.
This approach is most useful for chattels that have economic value but
whose fair market value cannot be measured precisely because of the
market's small size.20 6
204. Under the majority rule, the defendant in a wrongful death action may not intro-
duce evidence of the surviving spouse's remarriage to mitigate damages. Benwell
v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Hardware State Bank v.
Cotner, 302 N.E.2d 257, 263 (Ill. 1973); Dubil v. Labate, 245 A.2d 177, 178-79
(N.J. 1968); Wiesel v. Cicerone, 261 A.2d 889, 891 (R.I. 1970); Addair v. Bryant,
284 S.E.2d 374, 379-80 (W. Va. 1981).
205. Courts routinely uphold six-figure awards for loss of a child's society in wrongful
death actions, regardless of the size of the family or the parents' ability to have
additional children. See DiRosario v. Havens, 242 Cal. Rptr. 423, 431 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987); Barnes v. Bott, 615 So. 2d 1337, 1341-42 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Guzman
v. Guajardo, 761 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). One court reversed as
shocking and clearly inadequate an award of zero damages for the plaintiffs' loss
of society of their seventeen-year-old son and suggested an additur of $400,000
for lost society: "It is a rare life that is monentarily worthless and does not trigger
some type of measurable sorrow in a surviving parent." Donaldson v. Anderson,
862 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Nev. 1993).
206. In one case, the court found that an outsized barge's fair market value could not
be precisely determined because of the small number of such barges in existence
worldwide and the correspondingly small number of sales transactions involving
such barges. King Fisher Marine Service, Inc. v. NP Sunbonnet, 724 F.2d 1181,
1185-86 (5th Cir. 1984). The court used "value to the owner" as a more appropri-
ate way to measure the plaintiffs loss. Id.
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Given its economic component, the "value to the owner" approach
arguably has limited utility in animal destruction cases. Certainly,
some highly trained companion animals might be valued appropri-
ately for their worth to the owner. For example, a dog specially
trained to perform in movies might have an extremely uncertain mar-
ket value, but one might ascertain the dog's value to the owner by
examining its income earning potential2O7 or the cost of training. Sim-
ilarly, a purebred dog that had placed in dog shows might have a value
to the owner based on the future stud fees to be earned from breeding
the dog.208 But once again the typical household pet ends up being
undervalued using this approach. Factors like replacement cost or
earning capacity lead to only a nominal recovery.
Some courts using the "value to the owner" approach have consid-
ered the sentimental elements associated with certain objects. 20 9 Rec-
ognizing that some chattels, such as family heirlooms, photographs,
and trophies, have virtually no value apart from sentiment, these
courts have allowed the trier of fact to consider the owner's under-
standable and normal attachment to such items in setting dam-
ages.2 10 Often, the owner's testimony as to the item's value to him/her
serves as the principal basis for the damage award. 2 11
This expanded "value to the owner" approach moves a step closer
to recognizing that the largest part of the value of household pets to
their human companion stems from the humans' sentimental attach-
ment to them. "Sentimental attachment" may be equated in some
sense to the concept of society. We become emotionally attached to
companion animals because we appreciate their companionship -
their loyalty, their physical proximity, even their dependence upon us.
Just as people value the society of their spouses, children, and other
intimates, they rely upon the society of their pets. When a pet dies
prematurely because of another's wrongful act, we experience the loss
of that society as a genuine injury. Therefore, insofar as the "value to
the owner" concept attempts to compensate for the loss of the animal's
207. See, e.g., Paguio v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 21 A.2d 667, 668 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1941) (awarding plaintiff $500 for loss of dog seemingly based on loss of
earnings from the dog's participation in a stage act).
208. See, e.g., McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750, 751-52
(Ohio Ct. Cl. 1994) (awarding plaintiff $5,000 in part based on projected mating
fees of deceased dog).
209. See Landers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 915 P.2d 614, 619 (Alaska 1996);
Campins v. Capels, 461 N.E.2d 712, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Bond v. A.H. Belo
Corp., 602 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
210. See Bond, 602 S.W.2d at 109 (stating that adequate compensation for items with
no value except that derived from sentiment should take into account "the rea-
sonable special value of such articles to their owner taking into consideration the
feelings of the owner for such property").
211. See Campins, 461 N.E.2d at 722 (basing damages award for lost trophy rings on
the dollar value set by the plaintiff in his testimony).
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presence in the owner's life, it more accurately quantifies the actual
injury to the owner because of the animal's demise.
This approach, however, poses some conceptual and practical diffi-
culties. "Sentimental attachment," on some level, may imply mawkish
or saccharine feelings and perhaps does not afford human emotions
toward companion animals the full dignity that they deserve. Courts
considering the sentimental value of companion animals, moreover,
normally predicate the ultimate award of damages on the owner's tes-
timony as to the value of the animal to him/her.212 Unless forced to be
more specific, plaintiffs may be inclined to set entirely arbitrary
figures on their animals' value, increasing the risk of inconsistent and
inaccurate damages awards. 2 13
Those courts that have awarded damages for loss of a companion
animal's society are attempting to value companion animals in a way
that more accurately reflects their true worth in modern society.
Humans keep and care for household pets largely for their companion-
ate function.2 14 Just as the law has evolved to value children in
wrongful death actions largely for their society, the law, it may be ar-
gued, should value companion animals for their companionship in the
household.
But at least two differences exist between children and animals as
part of the family unit. Wrongful death cases typically examine the
lost society experienced by particular members of the family. In other
words, the parents had one type of relationship with the now deceased
child; the child's siblings had a different type of relationship. In states
that allow wrongful death recoveries by parents, siblings, and children
of the victim, each plaintiff must establish the nature of his/her rela-
tionship with the deceased and the extent of the lost society.2 15 Often,
212. See, e.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Chase, 23 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ark. 1930) (af-
firming verdict of $150 where the plaintiff had testified that the dogs killed were
worth $75 to $100 each); Seidner v. Dill, 206 N.E.2d 636, 640 (Ind. App. 1965)
(affirming verdict of $600 where the plaintiff had testified that he would have
given $500 if the defendant had not killed his dog), overruled by Puckett v. Miller,
381 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. App. 1978).
213. Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1145 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001) (noting ex-
pert's testimony that "in the mind of a pet owner, the value of a pet could be as
high as the national debt."') (quoting Nichols v. Sukaro, 555 N.W.2d 689 (Iowa
1996).
214. See James Serpell & Elizabeth Paul, Pets and the Development of Positive Atti-
tudes to Animals, in ANIMALS AND HUMAN SOCIETY: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES 130
(Aubrey Manning & James Serpell eds., 1994) ("[P]ets are not normally expected
to perform useful functions .... [Aind the idea of putting them to work is typi-
cally greeted with a sort of baffled amusement.").
215. See, e.g., Barnes v. Bott, 615 So. 2d 1337, 1341-1342 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (award-
ing mother of a deceased child $200,000, but giving no damages to the father
where the father saw his son rarely and had no meaningful relationship with
him).
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each plaintiff recovers damages separately for the loss of the victim's
society and companionship. 216
Where a companion animal has died, on the other hand, arguably
it is difficult to disaggregate the loss of society experienced by differ-
ent members of the household.217 Considerations of judicial economy
and avoidance of excessive awards might dictate that when an animal
is wrongfully killed, the family in which the animal lived may recover
a single award for the loss of the animal's society.2 18 One advantage
of this method is that the plaintiffs need not establish "ownership" of
the animal by one person. Property-based approaches of valuing chat-
tels demand that the plaintiff be the titleholder or owner of the de-
stroyed or damaged item. With respect to companion animals,
ownership by one person may be difficult to establish. Often, the
animal is not purchased as such,2 19 and even if it has been, the origi-
nal owner may have made an express or implied gift of the pet to an-
other member of the household.220
In addition, by making a single award of damages to the house-
hold, one may be able to avoid repetitious testimony by each family
member seeking his/her own recovery about the importance of the pet
216. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 641 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming the
trial court's allocation of wrongful death damages: 65 percent to the deceased
child's mother, 35 percent to the father based on the mother's custody of the child
and the greater amount of time spent with him); LeJeune v. Allstate Ins. Co., 373
So. 2d 212, 215-16 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (awarding varying amounts for lost society
to the decedent's spouse, one minor child, and three adult children).
217. One court described this problem: "[Ilt is difficult to define with precision the
limit of the class of individuals who fit into the human companion category. Is
the particular human companion every family member? The owner of record or
primary caretaker? A roommate?" Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795,
802 (Wis. 2001).
218. The single award could be divided equally among the various members of the
household. For example, in a family of four living in the same household, each
member would receive one-fourth of the total damages for loss of the pet's society.
See, e.g., Pannell v. Guess, 671 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (Miss. 1996) (dividing insurance
proceeds in wrongful death action equally among the deceased's surviving benefi-
ciaries as required by the Mississippi statute). See generally 3 JEROME H. NATES
ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 22.02 [3] (2002) (describing various wrongful
death apportionment schemes used in different states).
219. A significant number of companion animals are found as strays or are acquired
from a neighbor or friend at no cost and with no bill of sale or transfer of title.
See, e.g., Aline H. Kidd & Robert M. Kidd, Children's Attitudes Toward Their
Pets, 57 PSYcHOL. REP. 15, 21 (1985) (stating that 30% of the children surveyed in
their study reported that a friend or neighbor had given them the family pet);
Hawke Fracassa, Philip James Tocco: Restaurateur Enjoyed Teaching Culinary
Arts, DETROIT NEWS, May 23, 2002, at 2C (describing the deceased as someone
who took in stray dogs and cats); Russell Jenkins, Cat Found After Trip of 63,000
Miles, TIMES (London), July 19, 2002, at 7 (Home News) (noting that a cat lost in
an airline cargo hold had been taken in as a stray).
220. For example, a parent may buy a puppy at a pet store and then informally desig-
nate the animal as belonging to a son or daughter in the household.
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to that person and the loss of society experienced. One or two family
members could testify as to the animal's significance in the household.
By limiting the family to a single recovery, moreover, one decreases
the chances of excessive awards: the jury will make one assessment of
damages for the loss of society to the household, rather than a multi-
tude of individual awards. A single award is likely to be more moder-
ate than a collection of separate assessments of damages for each
family member.
Besides the arguably collective nature of the relationships that
companion animals have with their human owners, pets are different
from human family members in another way. When a parent or a sib-
ling dies, the surviving child or sibling realistically cannot replace the
deceased relative. Adult plaintiffs will not normally acquire another
parent, sister, or brother. Obviously, when a child dies, the surviving
parents theoretically could have or adopt another child. But human
relationships are so complicated and human beings vary so much in
their individual personalities that another child does not replace the
deceased child. Similarly, although a plaintiff whose spouse was
killed could remarry, the wrongful death law in most states, nonethe-
less, allows the plaintiff to recover for the loss of the deceased spouse's
consortium. 2 21 This law embraces the idea that human relationships
are not interchangeable and that a person with whom one has shared
an intimate relationship is essentially irreplaceable.
Companion animals, although unique in their own way, arguably
can be replaced. Because of selective reproduction by breeders, pure-
bred cats and dogs may vary little in temperament, intelligence, and
abilities within a particular breed. Relationships between animal
companions and their humans, while somewhat complex and nuanced,
are at bottom perhaps more straightforward than those among
humans. 22 2 Given the abundance of unadopted companion animals,
people whose pets are killed can acquire another, similar animal with-
out too much difficulty. Although companion animals are not fungible
creatures by any means,2 2 3 any number of substitutes can success-
fully fill their role in the household.
221. See supra note 204 and cases cited therein.
222. That straightforwardness is undoubtedly part of the reason that humans find
relationships with pets so appealing. One does not have to deal with the myriad
of petty jealousies, unspoken resentments, and difficult behavior characteristic of
even good human relationships. The famous animal trainer Gunther Gebel-Wil-
liams once observed, "[i]fyou do right by [animals] ... and do not become careless
and lax, they will do the right thing in return. One can never be 100 percent
certain about people." Richard Severo, Gunther Gebel-Williams, Circus Animal
Trainer, Dies at 66, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A21.
223. One court described dogs as "property with personality," and suggested that
'while we can buy another pet that may fill some of the voids caused by loss of a
pet, there is no such thing as replacement." Van Patten v. City of Binghamton,
137 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104-05 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
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This partial interchangeability argues that companionship may
not be at the crux of what the injured plaintiff has lost when the
tortfeasor kills the plaintiffs companion animal. Certainly, compan-
ionship has been temporarily lost, but in some sense, it can be re-
placed by the acquisition of a new animal. The new animal will
provide many of the same elements of affection, playfulness, and gen-
eral companionship that the previous animal did. Obtaining a new
pet, however, cannot significantly ameliorate the grief and mental
anguish caused by the premature death of the previous pet. Grieving
the loss of a loved one is a definable process that goes through a num-
ber of stages and takes a certain amount of time. Although a new pet
will undoubtedly distract most owners from their grief over the loss of
the previous animal, the owner will suffer undeniable mental anguish
over the previous animal's death.
Inevitably, pet owners suffer some mental pain when their pet dies
a natural death after a full life. But several factors may compound the
emotional suffering endured when a tortfeasor wrongfully kills an
animal companion. First, presumably the defendant's wrongful act
caused the animal's premature death.224 The human plaintiffs antici-
pation of several more years of his/her pet's company ends suddenly
and thus intensifies the person's mental suffering. Second, the man-
ner of the animal's death may be particularly disturbing to the owner.
The knowledge that the tortfeasor deliberately tortured or mutilated
the animal before killing it may devastate the owner, producing ex-
treme mental anguish. Even if the death was negligently caused, the
owner may be anguished to learn that the animal suffered considera-
ble pain before its demise. Third, the wrongdoer's apparent mental
attitude may also increase the plaintiffs negative feelings. If the
wrongdoer intentionally attacked and killed the pet, the plaintiff may
suffer feelings of revulsion and disgust at the thought that someone
would harm a virtually defenseless creature in that way.
C. Compensating for the Intangible Elements of the Human-
Animal Relationship
Based on the intensified mental anguish that a human guardian
experiences upon the wrongful death of a companion animal, I propose
that the law recognize a claim on behalf of pet owners for the emo-
tional distress suffered when the defendant tortfeasor wrongfully kills
their pet. In addition, the plaintiff should be able to recover the fair
market value or, in some cases, the replacement cost of the animal.225
224. Sometimes the extent to which the animal's death is premature may be slight -
for example, where a veterinarian negligently causes the death of an elderly, ill
animal that would have died in a few days.
225. Replacement cost should include the cost of acquiring a substitute animal, the
cost of having it examined by a veterinarian, immunized, and spayed or neutered,
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The plaintiff should also receive compensation for the loss of the
animal's companionship for a reasonable time period in which to ac-
quire a new pet.2 2 6 If the defendant's wrongful act was carried out
intentionally or maliciously, then punitive damages should be availa-
ble. And finally, if legislatively enacted, the compensation scheme for
the wrongful death of companion animals should include a cap on
noneconomic damages.
My proposal satisfies the traditional tort policy objectives of com-
pensation, deterrence, and reflection of social values as well as the
traditional remedial policy objectives of corrective justice and eco-
nomic efficiency. 22 7 It also answers the classic objections to recogniz-
ing new claims based upon a purely emotional injury, namely
concerns about fraudulent claims, disproportionate liability, the im-
pact on the cost of veterinary care and other goods and services, and
the difficulties of assessing damages in an accurate, consistent, and
fair way.
As argued previously, the current common law method for assess-
ing damages for a destroyed companion animal based on his/her fair
market value undercompensates many human guardians of such ani-
mals, particularly animals that have no particular pedigree or skills.
and the cost of at least basic training (e.g., housebreaking, walking on a leash,
and so forth). See Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 313-14 (Alaska 2001).
226. The limitation on lost companionship to a reasonable replacement period also
dovetails with the traditional remedial requirement that a plaintiff may not re-
cover damages that could have been avoided by plaintiffs own actions (i.e., the
plaintiffs "duty" to minimize his/her own damages, also known as the avoidable
consequences rule). 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 380-81 (2d ed. 1993). If a
new companion animal could provide reasonable substitute companionship, then
the plaintiffs claim for lost companionship would be properly cut off after a rea-
sonable replacement period. What constitutes a reasonable replacement period
will depend on the availability of another similar animal (e.g., a pot-bellied pig
may be harder to obtain than a dog) and the plaintiffs financial resources (e.g.,
pretrial, the plaintiff may not be able to afford another purebred dog). In evaluat-
ing reasonableness, the trier of fact generally will consider the plaintiffs circum-
stances (i.e., what would a reasonably prudent person do to minimize damages in
the plaintiffs circumstances). Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 915-16 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997). In addition, a reasonable replacement period may include a pe-
riod of time in which to mourn the deceased pet. Some therapists do not advise
immediate replacement of the deceased animal if the owner does not feel entirely
ready to do so. Kathleen Boyes, When Your Beloved Pet Dies, You Don't Have to
Grieve Alone, CHI. TRIs., Mar. 6, 1994, at D1.
227. Although corrective justice and economic efficiency are often said to be opposing
views of remedial policy, some have argued that in fact they are related. See
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REV. 961,
1048 (2001) (pointing out that "one could stipulate that wrongful acts are those
acts by A that injure B and are inefficient") (footnote omitted); Richard A. Posner,
The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187, 201 (1981) ("Once the concept of corrective justice is given its correct
Aristotelian meaning, it becomes possible to show that it is not only compatible
with, but required by, the economic theory of law.").
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The "value to the owner" approach and the recognition of loss of soci-
ety claims move closer toward a level of true compensation, but they
both suffer from certain deficiencies outlined above. My proposal
identifies three separate elements that represent genuine losses by
the pet owner and that require individual compensation.
First, the plaintiff would be awarded the animal's fair market
value if one existed or the animal's replacement cost if the animal had
no market value. Presumably, purebred animals or those with special
skills or training would have an ascertainable market value. In some
cases, that market value will be higher than replacement cost, in some
cases lower.228 Ordinary household pets, however, usually have only
a nominal fair market value, but it may cost the plaintiff something to
replace the deceased pet (e.g., the adoption fee at an animal shelter or
the cost of having a "free" pet checked out by a veterinarian). Proper
compensation of the human plaintiff dictates that the cost of acquiring
another animal be awarded so that the plaintiff at least can choose to
replace the destroyed animal with a new companion.
My proposal's second component involves awarding damages for
loss of companionship for a reasonable replacement period after the
companion animal's death. This component seeks to compensate for
the lost society experienced by the pet owner during the period be-
tween the animal's death and the acquisition of a new pet.22 9 Because
of the animal companion's typical role in the family as comforter, play-
mate, and protector, the plaintiff suffers a genuine injury upon losing
the animal's society. By giving damages for that lost society, the law
acknowledges the injury and becomes more truly compensatory.
By limiting loss of society damages to a reasonable replacement
period, this proposal acknowledges that, to some extent, one pet can
replace another. Unquestionably, each companion animal has his/her
own unique qualities and special place in the human owner's heart.
228. For an animal whose market value diminishes with age, replacement of an eld-
erly animal might involve purchasing a young animal at a higher cost than the
older animal's fair market value. On the other hand, certain animals that un-
dergo special training may acquire additional value as they mature. Thus, a ma-
ture animal's fair market value might exceed the cost of replacing the animal
with a younger, untrained one. See Stettner v. Graubard, 368 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685
(N.Y. Town Ct. 1975) ("[Mlanifestly, a good dog's value increases rather than falls
with age and training.").
229. In some cases, replacement of the animal may not be feasible. For example, eld-
erly plaintiffs may choose not to replace their deceased pet on the assumption
that they may not be able to care for a young animal in a few years. See Lynette
A. Hart, Dogs as Human Companions: A Review of the Relationship, in THE Do-
MESTIC DOG: ITS EVOLUTION, BEHAVIOUR, AND INTERACTIONS WITH PEOPLE 173
(James Serpell ed. 1995). Where the plaintiff demonstrates the inadvisability of
replacing the pet, the court should award damages for the loss of the deceased
pet's society for the remainder of the pet's projected life expectancy or the owner's
projected life expectancy, whichever is shorter.
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But because of the fundamental similarities among members of the
same breed in particular, a person can reasonably replace the basic
functions served by a pet by acquiring another similar one.23 0 The
goal of any compensation scheme is to restore the plaintiff as nearly as
possible to his/her pre-tort position, not to overcompensate or un-
dercompensate the plaintiff. The restriction of lost society damages to
a reasonable replacement period reduces the chances of overcompen-
sation by recognizing that a subsequent animal companion can serve
many of the same roles that the previous one did.
The final compensatory element of my proposal involves awarding
damages for the plaintiffs emotional distress caused by the premature
demise of his/her companion animal.23 1 The social scientific evidence
discussed earlier establishes the depth of the human-animal bond and
the profound grief experienced by humans when their companion ani-
mals die. The circumstances of a tortious death, it has been argued,
will typically intensify that grief. Complete compensation of the
plaintiff, whose pet the defendant has wrongfully killed, demands that
the plaintiff receive damages for his/her emotional suffering. In many
ways, the essence of the injury to the plaintiff is the wrenching feel-
ings of grief, sorrow, and depression caused by the defendant's wrong-
ful act. Recognition of mental distress damages in this context evolves
logically from the tort law's acknowledgment of such damages in situ-
ations where the plaintiff has sustained significant psychic harm.
One of the traditional objections to affording greater compensation
to the prospect of "opening the floodgates" of litigation,232 not only to
230. See Van Patten v. City of Binghamton, 137 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104-05 (N.D.N.Y.
2001) ("[W]e can buy another pet that may fill some of the voids caused by the
loss of a pet . . ").
231. Other scholars have noted the incongruity of awarding economic damages for
companion animals that often have no economic value, while denying damages
for the intangible losses that constitute the crux of the pet owner's injury. See
Sonia S. Waisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of 'Non-Economic" Damages
for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative
Trend, 7 ANimAL L. 45, 53-64 (2001); Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law
Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionship for
the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal, 4 ANimA L. 33, 93 (1998); Debra
Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Ani-
mals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1096-99 (1995); William C. Root, Note,
"Man's Best Friend": Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal
Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for
Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 427-28 (2002).
232. In discussing the disadvantage of recognizing a claim for emotional distress from
the death of a family pet, one court observed: "Such an expansion of the law
would place an unnecessary burden on the ever burgeoning case loads of the
court in resolving serious tort claims for injuries to individuals." Johnson v.
Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); see also Rabideau v. City of
Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Wis. 2001) ("We are particularly concerned that
were such a claim [for emotional distress for the death of a dog] to go forward, the
law would proceed upon a course that had no just stopping point.").
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distressed pet owners but also to other individuals claiming emotional
anguish over the loss of inanimate objects that have sentimental
value, such as family photographs and heirlooms. Currently, pet own-
ers have little incentive to sue tortfeasors responsible for the injury or
death of their pets; the permitted recovery in most states is simply too
low to cover attorneys' fees and other litigation costs. Allowing recov-
ery for emotional distress damages in these cases would boost awards
significantly, and presumably, more claims would be brought and
litigated.
To allay fears of possibly excessive awards and disproportionate
liability, I propose a cap on the amount of noneconomic damages that
can be awarded in animal death cases.23 3 A cap would prevent juries
from being overcome with sympathy for the plaintiff and thus inflat-
ing the emotional distress damages beyond all reasonable bounds.
Even though courts have the power to reduce damages through remit-
titur,234 a legislative cap would ultimately be more effective in ensur-
ing uniformity of awards. 23 5 A cap would also send a message that
233. Several states have legislatively imposed caps on noneconomic damages. The
statutes vary significantly in a couple of important features. Some caps apply
only to medical malpractice actions; others limit noneconomic damages in all per-
sonal injury cases. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (2000) (imposing a cap in
all personal injury or death cases); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.1483(1) (1996)
(imposing a cap in medical malpractice actions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411
(2001) (same). Some caps are set at a fixed sum, such as $250,000; others are
calculated from a formula using the injured party's life expectancy. See, e.g.,
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (2000) (imposing a cap of $400,000 or the injured per-
son's life expectancy in years multiplied by $8,000, whichever is greater); CoLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102.5 (Supp. 2001) (imposing a basic cap of $250,000 on
noneconomic damages); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333.2(b) (1997) (imposing a cap of
$250,000); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (b)(1) (1998 & Supp. 2001)
(imposing a cap of $350,000 on noneconomic damages); MICH. Comp. LAws
§ 600.1483(1) (1996) (imposing a basic cap of $280,000 on noneconomic damages);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1(1)(b) (1996 & Supp. 2001) (imposing a cap of
$400,000 on noneconomic damages for claims arising between July 1, 2001 and
July 1, 2002).
234. The device of remittitur allows judges to require plaintiffs to accept either a re-
duction in a favorable jury verdict or a new trial. Courts must generally find that
the verdict was under the influence of "passion or prejudice" or that it shocks the
court's conscience. David Fink, Note, Best v. Taylor Machine Works, the Remitti-
tur Doctrine, and the Implications for Tort Reform, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 227, 243-44
(1999).
235. The appropriate amount of the cap, of course, is open to debate. Tennessee re-
cently became the first state in the country to enact a statute, known as the "T-Bo
Act," expressly providing for recovery of noneconomic damages resulting from the
intentional or negligent destruction of a pet. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403
(2000). The statute defines "pet" as "any domesticated dog or cat normally main-
tained in or near the household of its owner." TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (b)
(2000). Noneconomic damages are limited to "compensation for the loss of the
reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection of the pet," and
are capped at $4,000. Id. at. § 44-17-403 (a), (d). The act excludes, among others,
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although the human-animal bond is worthy of significant compensa-
tion, the law still recognizes that the bonds among humans are at the
heart of our existence and our social organization. 236
By including a component for loss of society and for mental
anguish, my proposal more fully compensates the human caregivers of
companion animals than does the current majority scheme of award-
ing only the fair market value of destroyed animals.237 It attempts to
licensed veterinarians and rural areas. Id. at. § 44-17-403 (e), (fM. Its application
to negligent acts is limited, as well, to those occurring on the property of the
deceased pet's owner or caretaker or occurring while the pet was under the owner
or caretaker's control or supervision. Id. at. § 44-17-403 (a).
Following Tennessee's lead, Illinois recently passed a law allowing pet owners
to recover damages for their pet's death or injury caused by another's aggravated
cruelty, torture, or other abusive act. 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3 (Supp.
2001). Damages include, but are not limited to, "the monetary value of the
animal, veterinary expenses incurred on behalf of the animal, any other expenses
incurred by the owner in rectifying the effects of the cruelty, pain, and suffering
of the animal, and emotional distress suffered by the owner." Id. Emotional dis-
tress damages are not capped, but punitive damages are limited to a minimum of
$500 and a maximum of $25,000 for each act of abuse or neglect. See also H.B.
5571, 2002 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2002) (authorizing action for economic
damages relating to the killing or injuring of a companion animal, punitive dam-
ages up to $3,500, and reasonable attorney's fees).
Similar bills have been introduced in Colorado and Massachusetts. See H.B.
1260, 64th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); S.B. 932, 183rd Gen. Ct., Reg.
Sess. (Mass. 2003). One of the Colorado bill's sponsors moved to withdraw it
shortly after its introduction, possibly because of lobbying efforts by "veterinari-
ans and opponents of trial lawyers." Julia C. Martinez, Pet Bill Killed by House
Sponsor, DENVER POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at B1.
236. Legislative caps have come under attack and been overturned in a number of
states on various constitutional grounds, such as equal protection, due process,
right to jury trial, and open courts provisions. Fink, supra note 234, at 267-68.
One court suggested that a cap is essentially a "legislative remittitur," without
the case-by-case deliberation and tailoring that underpin the traditional judicial
remittitur. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1079 (Ill. 1997). But
many states have upheld their statutory caps on noneconomic damages in per-
sonal injury actions. Fink, supra note 234, at 268-71. Given that my proposal
involves creating a legislative remedy that did not exist before and applying it to
all actions involving tortious destruction of a pet, the cap component might more
readily survive constitutional challenges than did caps on noneconomic damages
in traditional common law actions for product liability or medical malpractice.
237. My proposal does not purport to deal with the equally vexing question of how to
compensate plaintiffs whose companion animals have been injured, but not
killed. Traditionally, where the cost of repairs of personal property exceeds its
diminution in fair market value, the plaintiff may recover only the diminution in
fair market value. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 853 (2d ed. 1993). Some
courts, however, have allowed animal owners to recover the veterinary expenses
associated with treating the animal (and sometimes saving its life) even though
those expenses exceed the animal's diminution in fair market value. See Atwood
v. Boston Forwarding & Transfer Co., 71 N.E. 72, 72 (Mass. 1904) (awarding
expenses of treating horse that died along with its fair market value); Hyland v.
Borras, 719 A.2d 662, 664 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (upholding award of
$2,500 in veterinary expenses where replacement dog could be purchased for
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identify the core injury suffered by pet owners when a tortfeasor negli-
gently or intentionally kills their companion animal, namely the loss
of the bond with a particular animal and the often intense mental suf-
fering experienced when an animal dies prematurely. It recognizes
that, as with children, the value of companion animals in human soci-
ety ceased to be economic some time ago and now derives principally
from the loyalty, affection, and companionship that these animals
offer.
Similarly, my proposal furthers the traditional tort goal of deter-
rence. Arguably, the current fair market value standard of compensa-
tion insufficiently deters certain types of tortious behavior. Given
that the fair market value of most household pets is close to zero, the
civil law offers virtually no disincentive to the negligent, reckless, or
intentional killing of an animal companion. Because animal cruelty
laws are often vague or underenforced, 238 the criminal law rarely fills
in the gap in deterrence.
Inevitably, compensation and deterrence are interwoven with the
third traditional objective of tort law: the reflection of accepted social
values. As a society, we desire to compensate for injuries that we ac-
cept as worthy of acknowledgment and compensation. Similarly, we
want to deter activities that we regard as socially undesirable or
harmful. Society has come more and more to recognize emotional in-
juries as genuine harms deserving of compensation. Our vision of a
humane and civilized society now encompasses protection of individu-
als' emotional tranquility along with their physical integrity and prop-
erty interests. Social science data establish that companion animals
promote the emotional wellbeing of their human caregivers in a num-
ber of different ways and that emotional wellbeing is often seriously
disrupted when a companion animal dies, especially in a premature or
violent manner.23 9 To properly acknowledge and protect the emo-
tional sustenance furnished by such animals, the tort law should
award damages for its loss. 240
$500). One court, in allowing recovery of veterinary expenses, noted that to limit
plaintiffs to only fair market value would encourage them to not treat their ani-
mals and allow them to die. This result would be decidedly "inhuman." Zager v.
Dimilia, 524 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. Justice Ct. 1988). But see Stettner v.
Graubard, 368 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (N.Y. Town Ct. 1975) (capping recoverable vet-
erinary expenses at the dog's fair market value).
238. Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law's Role in Pre-
vention, 87 IowA L. REV. 1, 4, 29-42 (2001).
239. See supra notes 133-169 and accompanying text.
240. In recognizing the need to modernize the basis for child wrongful death recov-
eries, one court eloquently described the legal anachronism of valuing children
for their labors:
Yet there still exists in the law this remote and repulsive backwash of
time and civilization, untouched by the onward march of society, where
precedents we alone honor tell us that the value of the life of a child
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Just as compensation of this particular emotional injury reflects
certain contemporary social values, deterrence of tortfeasors in animal
death cases also furthers these values. In many animal cruelty cases,
the perpetrator acts with deliberate intent to harm the animal. Cer-
tainly, the desirability of deterring the purposeful torture and killing
of inoffensive companion animals is self-evident. Perhaps the pros-
pect of civil damages for the wrongful killing of such animals offers
more theoretical than actual deterrence; many tortfeasors in deliber-
ate cruelty cases may be judgment proof.24 1 Nonetheless, some of
these tortfeasors will have the assets to pay a significant judgment,
and even if they do not, it is important that the law reinforce the mes-
sage that deliberate cruelty to animals is unacceptable.
More often the actor kills the animal negligently or recklessly,
rather than intentionally (e.g., a motorist hits a dog in the street or a
veterinarian fails to treat adequately a sick cat). Even if companion
animals are regarded as merely property, unquestionably, a defendant
owes an animal's owner the duty to exercise reasonable care to pre-
vent injury to the owner's property. 242 The tortfeasor breaches that
duty whether he/she, while driving at an excessive rate of speed, hits
and destroys the plaintiffs dog or the plaintiffs fence. 2 43 In veteri-
nary negligence cases, courts are divided about whether the action
should proceed on a theory of bailment, simple negligence, or profes-
sional malpractice.244 But despite this doctrinal division, courts basi-
cally agree that a veterinarian owes the pet owner some duty of
must be measured solely by the standards of the day when he peddled
the skill of his hands and the strength of his back at the factory gates.
Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Mich. 1960). The court's comment can
be analogized, of course, to the changing role of companion animals in society.
241. See, e.g., State v. Picard, No. 38116-4-1, 1996 Wash. App. LEXIS 621, at *4
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1996) (indicating that defendant who cruelly killed sev-
eral cats was a juvenile).
242. In one of the classic injury-to-property cases, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,
Judge Learned Hand applied his famous formula of B < PL to determine the par-
ties' liability in negligence where a barge broke lose from its moorings, dumped
its cargo, and sank. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). B stands for the burden of
preventing a particular injury, P for the probability of the injury occurring, and L
for the magnitude of the injury. Id.
243. Of course, in many automobile accident cases involving companion animals, it
may be difficult for the plaintiff to prove negligence. For example, most drivers
would be unable to stop in time if an unleashed dog or cat dashed into the street
without warning. See Randal C. Archibold, Buddy Clinton, Friend to President
and Nemesis of Socks, Is Dead at 4'/2, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2002, at A20 (noting
that in the death of President Clinton's dog who was chasing a vehicle, the "police
have ruled the incident an accident and do not anticipate filing charges against
the driver."). An animal's "contributory negligence," if you will, might preclude a
number of claims.
244. Cheryl M. Bailey, Annotation, Veterinarian's Liability for Malpractice, 71
A.L.R.4th 811, 816 (1989).
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care. 24 5 By allowing for substantial recoveries for the negligent de-
struction of animals, the law acknowledges that animals, even if
viewed strictly as property, are worthy of significant protection.
Arguably, an expanded damages remedy for the wrongful destruc-
tion of companion animals should serve not only the traditional tort
policies of compensation, deterrence, and effectuation of social goals,
but also the classic remedial policies of corrective justice and economic
efficiency. Corrective justice is intimately related to compensation;2 46
it mandates that the wrongdoer restore the injured parties to their
pre-injury position as nearly as possible.247 Because it is difficult, if
not impossible, to remove or cure the mental anguish that some tort
plaintiffs suffer, they cannot be restored to their pre-tort position ex-
cept through an award of damages. Because the law cannot accom-
plish a literal restoration, it offers a substitutionary restoration.
As demonstrated above, most human guardians of companion ani-
mals suffer considerable mental anguish if their animal is negligently
or intentionally killed. This suffering arguably goes beyond the nor-
mal sadness experienced when the animal dies a natural death. To
place plaintiffs in their pre-tort position is literally impossible, but an
award of damages for emotional anguish provides a reasonable, if im-
perfect, substitute. In an effort to avoid overcompensating plaintiffs,
on the other hand, my proposal recognizes that in some ways a new
companion animal can substitute for the deceased one and, thus, lim-
its damages of lost society to a reasonable replacement period.
The remedial goal of economic efficiency seeks to promote the effi-
cient allocation of resources. Any activity has the potential to injure
245. In a bailment, the bailee is required to exercise due care in the handling of the
property bailed, and if the bailee fails to return the property to the bailor in
sound condition, it is presumed that the bailee did not exercise due care. Price v.
Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1152 (Penn. 1996). In negligence and professional mal-
practice cases, of course, the crux of the action is breach of a duty to exercise
reasonable care. Id. As one court phrased it, a veterinarian is 'duty bound to
bring to his service the learning, skill and care which characterizes the profession
generally." Ruden v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Iowa 1973).
246. Professors Kaplow and Shavell have criticized theories of corrective justice as
essentially incomplete because 'they do not themselves furnish a theory of
wrongfulness." Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REV. 961, 1095 (2001) (footnote omitted). They advocate the application
of welfare economics in evaluating legal rules: '[Liegal rules should be selected
entirely with respect to their effects on the well-being of individuals in society."
Id. at 967.
247. One author described corrective justice as, in essence, 'putting things right": '[it
requires those who have without justification harmed others by their conduct to
put the matter right. This they must do on the basis that harm-doer and harm-
sufferer are to be treated as equals, neither more deserving than the other. The
one is therefore not entitled to become relatively better off by harming the other.
The balance must be restored." TONY HONORS, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 73-74
(1999) (footnotes omitted).
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others. In some cases, it is less costly for the injurer to cease or modify
the activity than it would be for the victims to avoid the injury.2 48 In
other cases, the reverse will be true, for it will be cheaper for the vic-
tim to avoid the injury than for the injurer to change or modify the
activity. But unless one accounts for the full cost of an activity, in-
cluding the costs imposed on victims, it is impossible to determine
whether a particular activity is genuinely profitable and thus econom-
ically efficient. 24 9 In other words, the cost of an activity is determined
by the cost of the labor and materials devoted to it and also by the cost
of the externalities produced by it. Suppose I engage in a manufactur-
ing process that produces a high-pitched noise that only dogs can hear.
Additionally, suppose that as a result of continuous exposure to this
noise, dogs in neighboring communities become insane and have to be
euthanized to the family members' distress. One of the costs of my
activity is the destruction of a certain number of dogs. It is impossible
to judge the true profitability of my activity without accounting for the
harm caused by the injury to the animals and their human
companions.
Under the current majority rule, if I were found liable in tort for
the damages caused by my activity, I would have to pay the pet own-
ers the fair market value of their animals. But the majority rule, as
discussed above, does not fully account for the true value of the ani-
mals to their owners. Most pet owners experience considerable
mental anguish at their animals' premature demise. As a result, they
would not accept the modest sum offered by the fair market value
standard in exchange for having their animals undergo a painful or
needless death. Part of the utility that pet owners attach to their pets
is reflected in the substantial sums of money that many owners are
willing to pay to prolong their pets' lives, 250 to contribute toward the
rescue of another's pet,25 1 and to bequeath them in their wills. 2 52 In
248. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 48-49 (1987) (giving examples in the nuisance context).
249. See Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 670 (1979) ('In economic terms, [legal]
rules force one producer to internalize the external costs he imposes on others
250. See Jane E. Brody, V.I.P. Medical Treatment Adds Meaning to a Dog's (or Cat's)
Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at D4 (noting that some pet owners spend
"thousands of dollars to keep [their pets] alive and enjoying a reasonable quality
of life").
251. See Jaymes Song, Effort to Rescue Dog Adrift Unleashes Questions, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 26, 2002, at N8 (recounting that the Hawaiian Human Society expended
$48,000 garnered from the Humane Society of the United States and private do-
nations in attempt to rescue a dog stranded on a crippled tanker). See also Par
Belluck, Stranded Whales Dying Despite Rescuers' Efforts, N.Y. Times, July 31,
2002, at A12 (describing extensive efforts by volunteers to save numerous
beached whales).
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addition, many humans invest a significant amount of time, energy,
and money to care for and train their animals on a day-to-day basis.
That investment is presumably lost when the animal is killed
unnecessarily.
Many animal owners, one might assume, would be willing to pay
for at least some increase in the cost of certain activities to assure a
greater degree of safety for their pets.25 3 Because many of these activ-
ities involve direct interaction with animals, it is also likely that pet
owners, as opposed to non-pet owners, would bear the increased cost of
these activities. Non- pet-owners, for example, rarely purchase veteri-
nary services, obedience classes, and pet toys, all of which might lead
to the injury or death of an animal. For activities affecting the entire
consuming public, greater safety precautions undertaken because of
increased damages for animal destruction, will often benefit non-pet
owners as well. For example, if automobile owners drive more care-
fully because of their increased liability for injuring animals, this
careful behavior presumably benefits all pedestrians (human and non-
human) on the roadways. Similarly, if window manufacturers con-
struct their windows so as to minimize the danger of a screen
accidentally popping out, the improved construction will reduce acci-
dents involving children as well as pets.
Part of the total cost of accidents involves the cost of enforcing
one's compensatory rights. If injured parties must sue to recover dam-
ages, they incur attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses. Under
the American Rule, litigants bear their own litigation costs, and fee
shifting does not occur.2 54 One justification for the award of pain and
suffering damages to personal injury plaintiffs is that the awards help
to defray the cost of litigation for which plaintiffs are otherwise
uncompensated. 25 5
252. See Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Humans Die, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 617, 618 (2000) (stating that between 12% and 27% of pet
owners provide for their animals in their wills); Judith T. Younger, Paying Our
Debts to Our Pets, 2001 UNIV. MiNN. LAW ALUMNI NEWS 13 (explaining that the
Uniform Probate Code allows pet owners to set up valid and enforceable trusts
for the posthumous care of their animals).
253. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 184 (5th ed. 1998) ("Cus-
tomers should be willing to pay higher prices for the industry's product or service
up to the point where the last dollar spent buys just one dollar in accident cost
reduction.").
254. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); Union
Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. McCurdy, 781 So. 2d 186, 189 (Ala. 2000); Quealy v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 475 So. 2d 756, 763 (La. 1985); Hickey v.
Griggs, 738 P.2d 899, 902 (N.M. 1987).
255. See Jeffrey O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and
Suffering in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 2 U. ILL. L. REV.
333, 351-52 (1981) (suggesting that pain and suffering damages would be unnec-
essary if the defendant covered the plaintiffs attorneys' fees).
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The same justification applies, but even more so, to actions for the
wrongful death of a companion animal. The core recovery for destruc-
tion of a companion animal, namely the animal's fair market value,
remains the same, even under my proposal. Thus, the pecuniary dam-
ages in this instance are quite low, even lower than in a typical wrong-
ful death or survival action for a human.256 Without the prospect of
recovering nonpecuniary damages, pet owners will have little incen-
tive to sue for the destruction of their animals, knowing that attor-
neys' fees per se are not recoverable from the defendant.
The remedial goal of economic efficiency also aims to place any loss
on the party who can avoid it most cheaply. It is debatable to what
extent pet owners can take cost effective steps to avoid injury to their
pets caused by defective products and veterinary negligence.2 5 7 But
after the injury, plaintiffs can ameliorate the ongoing harm of lost
companionship, my proposal assumes, by acquiring a replacement
companion animal within a reasonable period of time. Although one
companion animal cannot completely replace another, there are
enough common features among species and breeds that a substitute
animal can provide, to a large extent, the same type of companionship
provided by the deceased animal. 258
D. Objections to Allowing Recovery of Intangible Losses
As alluded to previously,25 9 there are a number of traditional ob-
jections to recognizing claims for emotional distress and loss of society,
and any proposal to expand the available damages in pet destruction
cases must meet them: (1) the inappropriateness of commodifying
through damages awards the intangible benefits of a close relation-
256. In the typical wrongful death action the statutory plaintiffs may recover for the
financial contributions that the decedent would have made to them. 3 JEROME H.
NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 22.03 (2002). In the case of decedents
gainfully employed at the time of death, damages may easily run into the
thousands and even millions, depending on the decedent's projected work-life ex-
pectancy. See, e.g., Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121, 130 (Ind. 1994) (af-
firming wrongful death damages that included over one million dollars in
projected lost income).
257. Pet owners can superficially inspect supplies and toys bought for their animals,
but they will have little way of knowing, for example, if the stuffing inside a toy is
harmful if ingested. And as lay persons, most owners will have to simply trust
the advice given by their veterinarian. With respect to automobile accidents and
intentional animal abusers, owners can take some relatively cheap steps to re-
duce the chances of injury by simply keeping their animals inside, on a leash, in a
fenced yard, or otherwise under supervision.
258. A brief glance at any dog or cat breed book reveals that particular breeds have
their own special characteristics of physical appearance and personality. See,
e.g., THE BOOK OF THE CAT 53 (Michael Wright & Sally Walters eds., 1980) (not-
ing that Maine Coon cats are thought to be "the perfect domestic pets, with their
clown-like personality, amusing habits and tricks, and easily-groomed coat").
259. See supra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 82:783
THE CALCULUS OF ANIMAL VALUATION
ship; (2) the possibility of overwhelming numbers of fraudulent claims
diverting judicial resources; (3) imposition of damages awards dispro-
portionate to a tortfeasor's fault; (4)an undue increase in the cost of
certain goods and services produced by higher damages awards; (5)
the essentially unquantifiable nature of mental anguish damages; and
(6) the prospect of multiple, overlapping claims flowing from the same
incident. I will address each of these concerns in turn and demon-
strate that my proposal either dispels or lessens them.
As a threshold matter, one must consider the appropriateness of
giving a monetary recovery for the destruction of what was presuma-
bly a close and affectionate relationship. Some scholars have ques-
tioned the wisdom of attaching a dollar amount to personal
relationships. Professor Richard Abel has argued that the expansion
of tort remedies to encompass loss of society and the like "commodities
love."2 60 Commodification in this context sends several, perhaps un-
desirable, messages. For example, that "[aill relationships have a
monetary value and hence can be bought and sold."261 In addition,
awarding damages for lost society conveys the notion that a relation-
ship with an "impaired" individual (e.g., a wheelchair-bound spouse) is
less valuable than one with an "unimpaired" person.26 2
In applying this argument to pet destruction cases, one could argue
that allowing owners of companion animals to recover for their emo-
tional anguish and loss of the animal's society commodifies the
human-animal bond.63 It promotes the American fantasy that some-
how money can rectify human suffering and that one relationship can
replace another. The response to this argument is twofold: first, the
law has already commodified the human-animal relationship, even
more so than the human-human relationship, by basing damages on a
pet's fair market value, and second, although money will not bring
back the deceased human (in a wrongful death case) or the deceased
animal (in a pet destruction case), it is the only reasonable mechanism
that society has by which to acknowledge the importance of the bond
that has been severed. 264
260. Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195
(David Kairys ed. 1982).
261. Id. at 196.
262. Id. Awards for loss of consortium imply that the uninjured spouse should discard
her impaired partner and purchase a replacement with her monetary damages.
Id.
263. One non-lawyer friend, upon learning of this Article's topic, remarked that she,
an extremely devoted pet owner, would not want any money if one or both of her
animals were wrongfully killed: how could one possibly put a price tag on her
loving relationship with her animals, and, in addition, what real purpose would
money serve?
264. Professor Radin has observed that it is possible to conceive of compensation for
intangible injuries in a "noncommodified way": "[If we are clear that it is not a
quid pro quo, but rather a symbolic action that reinforces our commitments about
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One of the most frequently cited difficulties with judicial or legisla-
tive recognition of claims for mental anguish or emotional suffering is
the fear of fraudulent claims.265 As Dean Prosser once observed, "[iut
is now more or less generally conceded that the only valid objection
against recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious suits and
fictitious claims .... The danger is a real one, and must be met.
Mental disturbance is easily simulated."2 66 In the context of animal
destruction cases, many courts seem concerned that plaintiffs will ex-
aggerate the emotional anguish felt upon learning of a pet's death and
thereby recover undeserved damages. Undoubtedly, some plaintiffs
have the ability to fabricate mental suffering that, in fact, was not
experienced upon the pet's demise. Some pet owners may not have a
strong bond with their animals; a few may welcome the death of a
troublesome dog or cat.
The potentially legitimate concerns about fraudulent claims may
be overcome in a couple of ways. First, these concerns plague any ac-
tion for emotional distress or loss of society based on interference with
a relationship. An individual whose spouse has been injured by an-
other's negligence may recover for the loss of the spouse's consortium
in most states. 26 7 A parent whose child has been negligently killed
may receive damages for the loss of the child's society under many
wrongful death statutes.2 68 In neither instance is there any guaran-
rights and wrongs .... " Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensura-
bility, 43 DuKE L.J. 56, 85 (1993); see also Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible
Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 781-82 (1985) ("Although
money damages may not be an equivalent to the injury experienced, they can
serve an important symbolic means of preserving the entitlement of personal se-
curity and autonomy against infringement.").
265. One author dismissed the concern about fraudulent claims as more illusory than
real:
This cry [about possible fraudulent claims] has been raised against every
innovation in tort litigation. It is an insult to the whole judicial process
dedicated as it is to the winnowing of true claims from false ones. To
refuse to entertain valid claims because others might be fraudulently
brought is an argument of expediency rather of justice. Courts have al-
ready shown that they are quite capable of marking out the bounds.
12 F.F. STONE, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAw TREATISE: TORT DOCTRINE §170, at 217
(1977). See also Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (Cal. 1968) ("Undoubtedly, ever
since the ancient case of the tavern-keeper's wife who successfully avoided the
hatchet cast by an irate customer [in 1348], defendants have argued that plain-
tiffs' claims of injury from emotional trauma might well be fraudulent.") (citation
omitted).
266. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 328 (4th ed. 1971).
267. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES § 8.1(5), at 400 (2d. ed. 1993). For cases
equalizing the consortium claim between husbands and wives, see Rodriguez v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 686 (Cal. 1974); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302
N.E.2d 555, 564 (Mass. 1973); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 239
N.E.2d 897, 902-03 (N.Y. 1968).
268. 3 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 24.03 (2002).
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tee that the plaintiff, in fact, had a close relationship with the de-
ceased spouse or child.269 Even in intact families, one spouse could be
emotionally estranged from the other; a child might be emotionally
distant from his parents at the time of his death. Nonetheless, the law
recognizes that in most cases, an individual will experience at least
some loss of consortium upon his/her spouse's death, and a parent will
endure some lost society upon a child's death.27 0 The plaintiffs in
these situations must adduce evidence at trial to support their claims
for intangible damages. They must establish the depth and duration
of their relationship with the decedent and the specific ways in which
they were connected to the decedent and are now deprived of his/her
companionship and society.
The relationship between human and companion animal may be
analogized in many ways to that between spouses and parents and
children. Some human-pet relationships are superficial and not par-
ticularly emotionally profound. But, as with other family relation-
ships, one may assume that most pet owners experience some
emotional distress and loss of companionship upon the death of a pet.
The law presumes that the severance of a close familial relationship,
in most instances, produces grief, sadness, and a loss of the relation-
ship's positive attributes. It remains then for the plaintiff to prove the
exact extent of the mental anguish and lost society. Similarly, given
our common experience of human-companion animal relationships,
one can assume that the unwanted severance of such a relationship
results in emotional distress. But to recover any significant amount of
damages, the plaintiff should be required to prove the nature and du-
ration of the relationship with the animal and the extent of the mental
suffering experienced upon the animal's death.271
My proposed cap on intangible damages in pet destruction cases
also serves as some guard against fraudulent claims. Frivolous plain-
tiffs seeking to recover for falsified emotional anguish would have
269. Although the plaintiffs in wrongful death actions must show the nature and qual-
ity of their relationship with the decedent to recover for lost society, much of this
proof will flow from the plaintiffs' own testimony about their relationship with
the decedent. See, e.g., Samco Props., Inc. v. Cheatham, 977 S.W.2d 469, 480-81
(Tex. App. 1998) (noting the testimony of decedent's wife that he had a special
relationship with his five-year-old daughter, having shared in her feeding, diaper
changing, and bathing). No doubt some plaintiffs will exaggerate the depth of the
bond in hopes of increasing the damage award.
270. See Bullard v. Barnes, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (Ill. 1984) (holding that under the
Illinois Wrongful Death Act, "parents are entitled to a presumption of pecuniary
injury in the loss of a [minor] child's society"). See also Ballweg v. City of Spring-
field, 499 N.E.2d 1373, 1379 (Ill. 1986) (same for adult child).
271. One Illinois Appellate Court noted that although pecuniary injury would not be
presumed for plaintiffs claiming the loss of their sibling's society under the
Wrongful Death Act, they at least should be given the opportunity to prove their
losses. Schmall v. Village of Addison, 525 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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their ambitions tempered by the knowledge that they could not re-
cover damages above the amount of the legislative maximum. With-
out the prospect of enormous recoveries, many fraudulent plaintiffs
presumably would be deterred from pressing suit whereas legitimate
plaintiffs, motivated by their genuine feeling of injury, would still go
forward, despite the relatively modest damages.
Two related fears concerning emotional distress and lost society
claims are disproportionate liability and the increased cost of goods
and services. Critics of such claims argue that awards for intangible
damages may increase the overall damage awards in certain cases
many times over. In some instances, this increase may result in mon-
etary liability greatly in excess of the tortfeasor's wrongdoing. For ex-
ample, if a veterinarian committed relatively slight negligence but
that negligence caused the death of a dearly beloved dog, the emo-
tional distress and loss of society damages might be significant. But
the prospect of disproportionate damages is an inevitable feature of
any tort compensation system. The driver of a motor vehicle may
have a low level of fault, but, nonetheless, the driver's actions may be
the proximate cause of severe injuries to the plaintiff. The driver or
the driver's insurance company will be liable for the full extent 2 72 of
the plaintiffs medical and rehabilitation expenses, which could easily
run into millions of dollars. Similarly, a relatively careful but some-
what negligent defendant could be liable for thousands of dollars in
lost wages damages for injuring a well-paid plaintiff whereas a much
more culpable defendant might be responsible for modest damages for
hitting an unemployed person.
The disjunction between fault and damages is similarly present in
pet destruction cases. 2 73 A veterinarian could be only modestly negli-
gent in causing the death of an adored family dog, but because of the
close relationship between the dog and the owners, the trier of fact
might be inclined to award substantial damages. The same doctor
could be grossly negligent in caring for a homeless animal and have no
liability at all because of the absence of a proper plaintiff. But cer-
tainly, any tort compensation system that attempts to be truly com-
272. If the plaintiff were at fault as well, the defendant's share of the damages would
be reduced or eliminated in comparative and contributory negligence jurisdic-
tions. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 65,
at 451-52, § 67, at 468-74 (5th ed. 1984).
273. Of course, current state laws may restrict the circumstances under which the law
deems the destruction of an animal "wrongful." Some states eliminate liability
where an individual kills or injures an animal threatening property such as live-
stock. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-4(f) (2003) (abolishing civil and criminal
liability on the part of an individual who humanely kills or injures 'an animal
reasonably believed to constitute a threat for [sic] injury or damage to any prop-
erty, livestock, or poultry").
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pensatory will produce its share of seemingly "disproportionate"
damages.
Once again, the proposed cap on noneconomic damages resulting
from the death of a companion animal as well as the restricted nature
of the lost companionship damages should lessen the chances of dis-
proportionate liability. A defendant whose negligence causes the
death of a much beloved family pet, particularly where the owner wit-
nessed the event, would likely be liable for a substantial amount of
noneconomic damages, whether or not the defendant was only slightly
negligent or more extensively so. The cap, however, on noneconomic
damages would insure that the award did not exceed a certain level
deemed appropriate for the loss of a pet.27 4 In addition, my proposal
restricts loss of society damages to a suitable replacement period. In
the case of a common household pet, replacement could occur within a
matter of days or at most a few weeks. The restricted period for lost
companionship also reduces the likelihood of excessive awards.
Related to the objection of disproportionate liability is the argu-
ment that expanding damage awards in pet destruction cases will dra-
matically increase the cost of certain goods and services, particularly
veterinary care and pet-related products and services. There is little
doubt that the cost of particular goods and services would increase
with the advent of increased damage awards. As medical malpractice
and product liability awards have risen over the past twenty-five
years, there has been a sometimes startling increase in insurance and
manufacturing costs, which are inevitably passed on to the consuming
public. 2 75
The response to this argument is threefold. First, as discussed ear-
lier, many of the increased costs will be borne by pet owners, not by
the consuming public in general. Pet owners presumably are the main
consumers of veterinary services, animal supplies and toys, and train-
ing classes, all of which might cause injury to companion animals.2 76
274. Professors Calfee and Rubin have argued that compensation for nonpecuniary
losses have adverse economic effects, such as price distortion and the disparity
between damages and optimal prevention. John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin,
Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371, 402 (1992). They contend that in contractual settings, liquidated
damages for nonpecuniary losses may "provide some deterrence while avoiding
the extreme effects of overcompensation." Id. at 403. Certainly, in a noncontrac-
tual setting, a cap on nonpecuniary damages can serve much the same function
as liquidated damages by providing a ceiling on recovery.
275. DOUGLAS _ycocE, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 169-75 (3rd ed. 2002) (discuss-
ing the sometimes disputed assertion that higher damages awards have driven
up the cost of products and insurance).
276. In 2001, Americans spent approximately $28.5 billion on pet-related goods and
services, including food, grooming, and medical care. Michelle Leder, Personal
Business: How Much Is That $100 Deductible in the Window?, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 2001, § 3, at 10.
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One might assume that such individuals would tolerate some increase
in the cost of animal-related goods and services to augment the safety
of their animals. To avoid the increased tort liability, purveyors of
veterinary services and other animal-related goods and services theo-
retically should take at least some steps to reduce the quantity and
extent of injuries to companion animals.2 77 In general, non-pet own-
ers do not purchase such goods and services and would thereby be in-
sulated from the price increases.2 78
Second, sellers of goods and services that cause injury and death
are unable to pass along all of the costs of liability to consumers. 279 In
a free market, to remain competitive, sellers cannot raise their prices
to absorb completely the cost of damage awards. 28 0 Thus, some acci-
dent-prone sellers will not survive and will be driven from the market.
The demise of the more careless providers of goods and services will
presumably raise the overall standard of safety within an industry.
The greater level of safety will result in fewer injuries to companion
animals.
Third, whenever the system for imposing civil liability attempts to
become more truly compensatory to injured individuals, there is the
possibility of some increase in the costs of goods and services. That
increase may render certain goods and services unaffordable by some
members of the public. For example, higher prices for veterinary ser-
vices may render those services unavailable to less wealthy individu-
als. As a result, these individuals may forego pet owning or provide
less care for their animals. A lower frequency of pet owning will mean
more homeless animals, many of whom will be destroyed. 28 1 Less vet-
erinary care will result in more animals enduring a certain degree of
suffering or being euthanized because the owner cannot afford the ex-
pense of prolonged treatment.
277. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 73-75 (1970) (discussing the cor-
relation between accident costs and general deterrence in tort liability). Profes-
sor Priest has pointed out that manufacturers, when faced with tort liability, can
either invest in additional safety precautions or increase their insurance cover-
age. In either case, "product costs will increase and the product price will in-
crease." George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1565 (1987).
278. Obviously, some non-pet owners buy pet toys and supplies as gifts for pet owners,
but the portion of their total expenditures devoted to these items would be rela-
tively small.
279. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 184 (5th ed. 1998) (noting
that a seller's inability to pass along tort liability costs to its customers especially
in situations where the accidents occurring involve mainly non-customers).
280. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 452 (Wis. 1980) (pointing out
that sellers are not always in a position to pass along all of the costs of tort liabil-
ity to consumers and may have to accept lower profits instead).
281. See Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law's Role in
Prevention, 87 IowA L. REV. 1, 70, n.437 (2001) (noting statistics on the high num-
ber of animals euthanized in animal shelters across the country).
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With a possible lower incidence of pet owning, society would need
to address the problem of surplus companion animals in other ways,
such as more aggressive attempts to sterilize animals.2 82 The impact
of higher prices for veterinary services can be diffused by the greater
availability of pet insurance, which has only recently been devel-
oped.283 Veterinarians may make the ethical choice to offer lower fees
to poorer clients and to have their wealthier clients subsidize the less
affluent ones. 28 4
In the end, the tort compensation system must always make a
choice between placing the full cost of accidents on the tortfeasor or
forcing the tort victim to bear some or all of that cost. But, ultimately,
the system's avowed primary goal is to compensate the tort victim for
the injury received. In cases of pet destruction, the principal injury is
the emotional anguish experienced by the human companion. Most
pets do not contribute economically to the household, nor do they have
even the prospect of contributing economically, as do children when
they mature. In addition, unlike inanimate objects such as cars and
furniture, companion animals can have genuine relationships with
humans; relationships that are severed and at least partially irre-
placeable when the animal is killed. Most people experience consider-
able grief, sorrow, and other types of mental anguish upon the
untimely and needless death of their pets. A tort system that purports
282. Over a period of two decades, spay and neuter programs have reduced by one-
third the number of dogs in the New York City shelter system. Rick Marin, Worst
in Show, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, § 9, at 1. See also Sharon Barrett, Pet
Projects, CHI. THIB. MAG., July 28, 2002, at 30 (noting that a burgeoning number
of stray dogs and cats could be reduced through sterilization); Sally Kestin, Too
Late for Too Many, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), June 23, 2002, at 1A (same).
283. See Michelle Leder, Personal Business; How Much Is That $100 Deductible in the
Window, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2001, § 3, at 10 (recounting the growing demand for
pet insurance in the U.S. and its widespread acceptance in parts of Europe); Judy
Mandell, Pet Health Plans and Pet Insurance, CAT FANcy, June 2002, at 24
(describing various pet insurance plans). Some pet health insurers currently of-
fer plans with premiums starting at less than ten dollars per month, depending
upon the pet's age and species and the extent of coverage. Veterinary Pet Insur-
ance, There Are Times When Love Isn't Enough, at http'/www.petinsurance.com
(last visited Jan. 6, 2004); PetCare Pet Insurance Programs, Quick Care for In-
door Cats, at http//www.petcareinsurance.com/us/cat/indoor/index.asp (last vis-
ited Jan. 6, 2004).
284. The American Veterinary Medical Association encourages pro bono service to the
profession by giving an annual award for contributing to animal welfare. Davis'
Aid to Impoverished Animals Earns Welfare Award, J. AM. VETERINARY MED.
AsS'N, at http://www.avma.orgtonlnews/javma/feb00/s02010Ob.asp (last visited
Jan. 6, 2004). In addition, the American Animal Hospital Association's executive
director recently called for veterinarians to donate some of their services to
poorer clients and homeless animals. "The Golden Age of Veterinary Medicine," J.
AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N, at http://www.avma.org/onlnews/javma/mayO1
s050101e.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
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to compensate for the loss suffered by plaintiffs should provide for
damages for the emotional suffering sustained.
Another commonly voiced objection to awarding intangible dam-
ages resulting from the negligent killing of a companion animal is the
difficulty of assessing such damages in a fair and consistent manner.
Because intangible damages are just that, intangible, there are no
market or other economic standards upon which to base them. Juries
are often instructed to give a "fair and reasonable compensation" for
pain and suffering, emotional distress, mental anguish, and the
like.285 Mental anguish that one jury views as worth $1,000, another
might value at $100,000. The specter of unpredictable and inconsis-
tent damage awards has caused a number of courts to balk at ex-
tending tort liability for intangible losses.
The amorphous nature of intangible damages, however, is not ulti-
mately a sufficient reason to deny the claim altogether. Any time the
law allows recovery of damages for emotional distress or lost society,
the measurement difficulty emerges. By their very nature, such dam-
ages cannot be measured with precision.286 They do not and are not
intended to compensate for economic harm. As mentioned previously,
they are a substitute for actual restoration of psychic tranquility.287
285. Graeff v. Baptist Temple of Springfield, 576 S.W.2d 291, 301-02 (Mo. 1978);
DeMaris v. Whittier, 569 P.2d 605, 607 (Or. 1977); Lockett v. Martin Fein Inter-
ests, Inc., No. 01-98-01333-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6995, at *14 (Tex. App.
Oct. 18, 2001).
286. Scholars have wrestled with the fairness problems posed by widely inconsistent
awards for noneconomic damages and have suggested possible methods of creat-
ing greater uniformity. One suggested solution is the creation of legislative cate-
gories of pain and suffering with prescribed dollar amounts for each category.
Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 908, 940-45 (1989). Under this scheme, juries
would be asked to render a special verdict, indicating the precise amount of
noneconomic damages awarded. Special verdicts would assist both in trial and
appellate review of the award and in the creation of a database of awards for
noneconomic losses. Id. at 962; see also James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort
Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8
YALE J. ON REG. 171, 178-79 (1991) (proposing that based on a comprehensive
data base of prior damage awards, juries should be instructed as to presumptive
ranges of appropriate awards in particular cases).
Another proposal centers on the notion of"ex ante full-compensation award."
Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REV. 773,
804-810 (1995). Under this proposal, juries would be instructed to determine the
maximum amount that a reasonable person would have been willing to pay to
eliminate the risk that existed in the case of the person's incurring the severity of
pain and suffering that the plaintiff now experiences. Id. at 842-43. The jury
would be instructed to multiply the amount determined by the risk of injury and
to award damages for pain and suffering based on that product. Id.
287. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
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They serve as imperfect compensation and also as a means of deter-
ring negligence and intentional wrongdoing.
Finally, some courts have balked at enlarging recoveries for mental
anguish and loss of society for fear of duplicative claims flowing from a
single incident. These concerns generally take two forms: first, the
possibility that juries will overcompensate plaintiffs if they are al-
lowed to award damages both for mental distress and for loss of com-
panionship,28 8 and second, the danger that in a single family several
claimants will come forward and seek noneconomic damages, again
resulting in possible overcompensation. 28 9 The first concern focuses
on the inherent difficulty of distinguishing among types of emotional
injury. An individual whose spouse is killed experiences a constella-
tion of emotions, including grief, sorrow, loneliness, isolation, and so
forth. In awarding damages, the trier of fact may not be able to differ-
entiate adequately between mental anguish and lost society so as to
give appropriate compensation for each.290 Thus, many states refuse
to allow a separate award for mental anguish and roll it into the cate-
gory of lost companionship and society.29 1
In addition, in non-death cases, courts have been worried about the
potential overlap between the intangible damages awarded to the in-
jured victim and those given in derivative claims to relatives of the
288. See Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439, 448 (Iowa 1971) (allowing dam-
ages for loss of society but not for mental anguish or grief); Moore v. Lillebo, 722
S.W.2d 683, 687 (Tex. 1986) (stating that "[slome have suggested that these dam-
ages necessarily overlap"); Wilson v. Lund, 491 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Wash. 1971)
(allowing mental anguish to be recovered as a component of loss of companion-
ship and noting that separating the two concepts involves "a totally unrealistic
and conceptually indefensible surgical scalpel technique to distinguish ... dam-
age to the parent-child relationship from emotional damage").
289. See Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972) ("Magnification of
damage awards to a single family derived from a single accident might well be-
come a serious problem to a particular defendant as well as in terms of the total
cost of such enhanced awards to the insured community as a whole.").
290. See Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 216 (N.J. 1980) ("[T]he loss of the prospective
emotional satisfaction of the companionship of a child when one is older is but
one example of the innumerable similar prospective losses occasioned by the
child's death - all of which, plus much more, is included in the emotional suffer-
ing caused by the death.").
291. 3 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 24.03[21 (2002). Based on
similar reasoning, many courts do not allow a separate recovery for loss of enjoy-
ment of life in non-death cases, but instead consider lost enjoyment to be one
element of pain and suffering. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 376 (N.Y.
1989) ("[S]uffering... can easily encompass the frustration and anguish caused
by the inability to participate in activities that once brought pleasure."); Wil-
linger v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 393 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Pa. 1978) ("[Tlhis Court
has never held that loss of life's pleasures could be compensated other than as a
component of pain and suffering.").
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victim for loss of affection, companionship, and society.29 2 In non-
death cases, injured victims will normally receive substantial awards
for their own pain and suffering, including, in many states, an amount
for loss of enjoyment of life. 2 93 If, indeed, the victim's children can
recover as well for the loss of their injured parent's society, there is a
considerable possibility of duplicative damages. Within a single fam-
ily unit, an award both for the injured victim's loss of enjoyment of a
full relationship with her children and also for the children's loss of
their mother's society may be viewed as compensating twice for the
same injury (the destruction of the family relationship as it existed
before the accident).2 94
The prospect of duplicative recoveries does not exist under my pro-
posal because the companion animals do not themselves have a claim
for their own pre-death or post-injury pain and suffering. Unlike the
human victim who will recover (or whose estate will recover in a sur-
vival action) for pain and suffering, there is no thought that the in-
jured or destroyed animal will have a claim on its own behalf.295 The
crux of my proposal is to compensate the human caregivers of compan-
ion animals for their economic and psychological injuries.
My proposal calls for compensation for the mental anguish exper-
ienced by plaintiffs upon the untimely death of their companion
animal as well as for the loss of companionship of the animal for a
reasonable replacement period. Under my proposal, both types of
noneconomic damages would be capped at a statutory limit. My pro-
posal addresses the concern about overlapping recoveries in two ways.
First, the cap ensures that the overall award of intangible damages
would be cabined and would not exceed a reasonable amount.
292. See Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 866 (Cal. 1977) (pointing out poten-
tial overlap between primary and derivative claims in personal injury cases); Ber-
ger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 436 (Mich. 1981) (Levin, J., dissenting) (observing
that "[w]hen a close link between two persons is disrupted, it is difficult to distin-
guish the injury suffered by each.").
293. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1(4), at 385-88 (2d. ed. 1993).
294. See Mendillo v. Bd. of Educ., 717 A.2d 1177, 1193 (Conn. 1998) (noting the diffi-
culty of distinguishing between the damage to the injured plaintiffs relationship
with her children and the damage to their relationship with her); Dralle v. Ruder,
529 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ill. 1988) (pointing out the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween the injured child's claim for pain and suffering and the "legally distinct but
factually similar claim by the parents for loss of the child's society and
companionship").
295. See Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (dis-
missing the plaintiffs claim for his dog's pre-death pain and suffering). For the
view that animals should have standing to enforce their own interests, see David
Favre, Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 DUKE L.J. 473, 501-02 (2000);
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA
L. REV. 1333, 1359-60 (2000).
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Second, my proposal recognizes that mental anguish and loss of
society are in fact conceptually distinct and time limited.296 Mental
anguish represents the often intense negative emotions experienced
upon the loss of something valuable (i.e. health, freedom, a significant
other, and so forth), especially a loss that comes about suddenly and in
a particularly disturbing manner. It is characterized by feelings of
sadness and grief.2 9 7 If the loss is not compounded by some ongoing
crisis, grief follows a prescribed course and duration. 2 98 Loss of soci-
ety, on the other hand, flows from the absence of the positive aspects
of a relationship,299 specifically the joy, comfort, companionship, and
solace that are an essential part of a good relationship with another
living creature. 300 Although the lost society could conceivably be felt
for the rest of the plaintiffs life, my proposal allows plaintiffs to re-
cover loss of society only for a reasonable replacement period unless it
would be infeasible for the plaintiff to replace the pet.3 01
A second concern revolving around mental anguish/lost society
claims is that multiple family members will press individual claims,
resulting in excessive damage awards. 302 For example, where a child
is severely injured or killed, conceivably the child's parents, grandpar-
ents, siblings, and any stepparents could all seek damages for the loss
296. For a good discussion of the difference between mental anguish and loss of com-
panionship, see Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 29-32 (D.D.C.
1998).
297. Mental anguish has been described as "a deep inner feeling of pain and hurt often
borne in silence." Connell v. Steel Haulers, Inc., 455 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir.
1972).
298. See ELISABETH KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING 34-121 (1969) (describing the
five stages of grief).
299. Society includes "a broad range of mutual benefits each family member receives
from the others' continued existence, including love, affection, care, attention,
companionship, comfort, and protection." Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573, 585 n.17 (1974).
300. As an example of the difference between mental anguish and lost society, con-
sider the situation of a pet owner who decides to give her pet to another caregiver
because the current owner can no longer care for the animal or is moving to an
apartment that does not allow pets. See, e.g., Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806,
809 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that plaintiff gave over her horses to new
caregivers when her physical disability prevented her from caring for the horses).
This pet owner may experience some sadness and grief at losing the pet, but the
predominant loss will be that of the pet's companionship. On the other hand, a
pet owner whose pet is violently killed in an automobile accident will feel not only
the loss of companionship but also intense anguish at the manner of the pet's
death, particularly if the pet suffered some period of time before death. Id. at 812
(discussing the anguish felt by a horse owner upon hearing about the violent
death of her former pet).
301. As mentioned earlier, an elderly or disabled plaintiff may not be able to take on
the burdens of caring for a new pet. See supra note 229.
302. See Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318, 321 (Or. 1982)
(pointing out the difficulty of limiting the class of plaintiffs entitled to recovery
for loss of an injured person's consortium).
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of the child's society as well as their mental suffering caused by the
injury or death.30 3 Such multiple claims could result in overcompen-
sation, some judges have argued, and could place an unwarranted
level of liability on the defendant. 30 4 My proposal answers this argu-
ment by allowing the family unit only one recovery for the destruction
of a family pet. The "single recovery" concept has several advantages,
many of which were outlined above.30 5 In this context, however, it
reduces the chances of overcompensation and excessive liability. The
members of the household in which the animal resided receive a single
recovery of damages for their collective emotional anguish and lost
companionship.
The "single recovery" concept coupled with the cap on intangible
damages in my proposal turns these damages into a kind of solatium,
a more-or-less fixed award for the plaintiffs wounded feelings. 30 6
Civil law countries have traditionally allowed a defined sum to com-
pensate the plaintiff for the intangible losses flowing from the plain-
tiffs injuries,30 7 and some American wrongful death statutes have
followed this model by providing a set amount for emotional injuries to
the decedent's survivors. 308 The idea of solatium damages for intangi-
ble losses has a certain appeal in this context because it limits dam-
303. See Villareal v. State, 774 P.2d 213, 219 (Ariz. 1989) (specifically excluding the
injured person's "siblings, grandparents, other relatives, or friends" from the
class of plaintiffs entitled to bring a lost consortium claim); Dralle v. Ruder, 529
N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ill. 1988) (noting that "[glrandparents, siblings, and friends suf-
fering similar losses of society and companionship would also seek to bring
claims, if recovery were to go unchecked"); Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 362
N.W.2d 137, 145 (Wis. 1985) (denying a stepfather any recovery for the loss of
society of his injured stepson where the boy had a living biological father).
304. Baxter v. Superior Ct., 563 P.2d 871, 873 (Cal. 1977); Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
563 P.2d 858, 863-64 (Cal. 1977). In contrast, a California appellate court had no
difficulty in defining broadly the permissible plaintiffs in a case where the defen-
dant funeral homes had allegedly mishandled human remains. Christensen v.
Superior Ct., 271 Cal. Rptr. 360, 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), modified 820 P.2d 181
(Cal. 1991). Those plaintiffs alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress
could include any close family member, namely 'relatives residing in the same
household, or parents, siblings, children, [grandchildren,] and grandparents of
the victim." Id. at 375 (quoting Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 n.10 (Cal.
1989). Plaintiffs alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress could include
all family members and close friends of the deceased. Id. at 376-77.
305. See supra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.
306. Professor Jaffe, referring to noneconomic harms, noted that 'though money is not
an equivalent it may be a consolation, a solatium." Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for
Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 224
(1953).
307. See Stuart M. Speiser & Stuart S. Malawer, An American Tragedy: Damages for
Mental Anguish of Bereaved Relatives in Wrongful Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REV.
1, 9-13 (1976) (discussing solatium damages in civil law countries).
308. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203.5 (1997) (allowing certain wrongful death
plaintiffs to elect a solatium award of $50,000 in lieu of proving actual
noneconomic damages).
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ages, in particular, damages about which our society may have some
ambivalence. Whereas almost any person can understand the mental
anguish experienced by someone whose close relative is suddenly and
perhaps brutally killed, not everyone can appreciate the extreme sor-
row and loss of companionship felt by those whose pet dies because of
another's negligent or intentional act. The proposed limit on intangi-
ble damages perhaps more accurately reflects the overall state of soci-
etal views about the worth of companion animals than would a
proposal for unrestricted recovery.
VI. CONCLUSION
Companion animals have played a myriad of important roles in
their human caregivers' lives since prehistoric times. More than inan-
imate objects, they provide companionship, affection, solace, and un-
critical acceptance of their human guardians. The law, however, has
valued them as commodities by restricting recovery for their destruc-
tion or injury to their fair market value. The fair market value of ordi-
nary pets, unless they have special qualities as breeding or working
animals, is usually close to zero and, as a result, plaintiffs whose pets
are destroyed through another's negligent or intentional act are left
with minimal damage recoveries.
Given the significance of companion animals in our lives, the
market value standard of recovery arguably is grossly undercompen-
satory.30 9 Some courts have attempted to avoid the undercompensa-
tion of the traditional standard by awarding damages based on "value
to the owner" or even giving some recovery for mental anguish. But
"value to the owner" is ultimately grounded in pecuniary loss, and
courts allowing mental anguish damages are few and far between,
again leaving most plaintiffs without adequate compensation.
In this Article, I proposed that the law, either judicially or legisla-
tively, compensate human plaintiffs for several different elements of
the human-animal relationship. My proposal provides for recovery of
replacement cost of the animal to cover the pecuniary cost of acquiring
a new pet. For purebred animals, replacement cost can be substantial
whereas the cost of replacing mixed breed pets will be, in most cases,
nominal. Awarding replacement cost allows plaintiffs to be restored
to their pre-tort position by procuring a substitute animal.
My proposal goes further, however, in allowing plaintiffs to seek
damages for emotional distress and lost companionship. Emotional
309. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 779, 851 (1994) (arguing that with respect to companion animals and cer-
tain other goods, the "objection to the use of markets in certain areas must de-
pend on the view that markets will have adverse effects on existing kinds of
valuation").
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distress damages would compensate pet owners for the immediate
shock, grief, and anguish that they experience upon learning of the
untimely death of their animals. Damages for loss of society would
recompense plaintiffs for the loss of the positive aspects of their rela-
tionship with their animals - the companionship and affection pro-
vided by a given animal. Under my proposal, lost society damages
would cover only a reasonable period in which to replace the pet. This
limited award for lost society recognizes that in many respects, a new
companion animal can serve many of the companionate functions of
the previous one.
In addition, both kinds of noneconomic damages, those for emo-
tional distress and those for lost society, would be capped, if my propo-
sal were to be enacted legislatively. The cap serves several purposes:
to avoid excessive awards in pet destruction cases, to avert dramatic
rises in the cost of veterinary services, to make the award for intangi-
ble losses in these types of cases more socially and politically accept-
able, and to acknowledge that pets, while significant members of a
family, do not carry the same worth as a human member of that
family.
Finally, besides replacement, emotional distress, and lost compan-
ionship damages, my proposal allows for punitive damages if the de-
fendant's actions were malicious or intentional. Similar to other torts,
pet destruction should lead to liability to exemplary damages if the
defendant consciously and deliberately chose to injure another. As in
other contexts, punitive damages would provide an additional level of
deterrence of tortious conduct.
In the end, my proposal hinges primarily on the overarching goal of
tort damages: to compensate victims of tortious conduct for their inju-
ries. In modern American society, the value of most companion ani-
mals to their human guardians derives from the emotional tie
between animal and human. By continuing to categorize domestic an-
imals as property, tort law ignores the true role played by these crea-
tures in our lives. Just as the law has evolved to recognize psychic
injuries suffered in a number of contexts, it should now acknowledge
that Fluffy is worth more than a toaster or a telephone to her human
guardians.
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